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[64] Consistent with this framework, the majority decision in Health Services framed s.2(d) as an individual right (“the right of employees”, para. 87 (emphasis added)) that mayrequire the protection of group activity (see also paras. 19 and 89). The fundamental inquiry iswhether the state action would substantially impair the ability of “union members to pursueshared goals in concert” (para. 96 (emphasis added)). As in Dunmore, the majority concludedthat the realization of the individual right required a capacity to act in common, which may give2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)rise to a need to protect group activities and, as a consequence, to recognize group rights.[65] In summary, Health Services was consistent with the previous cases on the issue ofindividual and collective rights. It recognized, as did previous jurisprudence, that s. 2(d) is anindividual right. But it also recognized, as did previous cases, that to meaningfully uphold thisindividual right, s. 2(d) may properly require legislative protection of group or collectiveactivities.[66] Rothstein J. also emphasizes that “[i]ndividuals who are not members of anassociation . . . have no constitutional right to oblige their employers to bargain” (paras. 179 and187). In our view, this outcome is not anomalous. It follows logically from the fact thatcollective bargaining is a derivative right, a “necessary precondition” to the meaningful exerciseof the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association: see CLA, at para. 30. Where there is noreliance on freedom of association, there is no derivative right to require employers to bargain.(iv) The Argument That Section 2(d) Is a Freedom, Not a Right