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within the freedom to organize, that is, the freedom to collectively embody theinterests of individual workers. [para. 30][29] Bastarache J. went on to hold that in order to realize the purposes of s. 2(d), the rightto organize must extend to “the exercise of certain collective activities, such as making majorityrepresentations to one’s employer”. He explained:2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)These activities are guaranteed by the purpose of s. 2(d), which is to promote therealization of individual potential through relations with others, and by internationallabour jurisprudence, which recognizes the inevitably collective nature of thefreedom to organize. [para. 30][30] The affirmation that s. 2(d) protection extends to collective activities that only agroup can carry out, required rejection of Sopinka J.’s fourth proposition in PIPSC, whichsuggested that s. 2(d) only protected the right to further individual goals. Bastarache J. pointedout that certain activities are, when performed by a group, “qualitatively different” from thoseactivities performed solely by an individual. He recognized that “trade unions develop needs andpriorities that are distinct from those of their members individually”. As a result “certaincollective activities must be recognized if the freedom to form and maintain an association is tohave any meaning” (Dunmore, at para. 17).[31] In the result, Bastarache J. concluded that the absence of legislative protection forfarm workers to organize in order to achieve workplace goals made meaningful association toachieve workplace goals impossible and therefore constituted a substantial interference with theright to associate guaranteed by s. 2(d) of the Charter. He found that the absence of legislative