Decision support experiments and evaluations using seasonal to ...

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3
Conservation
measures in one state
alone cannot mitigate
region-wide problems
affecting large, multistate
watersheds.
92
environmental impacts in allocation; and develop
specific allocation numbers—in effect,
guaranteeing volumes “at the state lines”. Water
allocation formulas were to be developed and
agreed upon by December 31, 1998. However,
negotiators for the three states requested at
least a one-year extension of this deadline in
November of 1998, and several extensions and
requests for extensions have subsequently been
granted over the past dozen years, often at the
11th hour of stalemated negotiations.
Opportunities for a breakthrough came in
2003. Georgia’s chief negotiator claimed that
the formulas posted by Georgia and Florida,
while different, were similar enough to allow
the former to accept Florida’s numbers and to
work to resolve language differences in the
terms and conditions of the formula. Alabama
representatives concurred that the numbers
were workable and that differences could be
resolved. Nonetheless, within days of this tentative
settlement, negotiations broke off once
again (Georgia Environmental Protection Division,
2002). In August 2003, Governors Riley,
Bush, and Perdue from Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia, respectively, signed a memorandum of
understanding detailing the principles for allocating
water for the ACF over the next 40 years;
however, as of this writing, Georgia has lost an
appeal in the Appellate Court of the District of
Columbia to withdraw as much water as it had
planned to do, lending further uncertainty to
this dispute (Goodman, 2008).
Policy impasse
Three issues appear to be paramount in the
failure to reach accord. First, various demands
imposed on the river system may be incompatible,
such as protecting in-stream flow while
permitting varied off-stream uses. Second,
many of the prominent user conflicts facing
the three states are up- versus down-stream
disputes. For example, Atlanta is a major user
of the Chattahoochee. However, it is also a
“headwaters” metropolis. The same water used
by Atlanta for water supply and wastewater discharge
is used by “up-streamers” for recreation
and to provide shoreline amenities such as high
lake levels for homes (true especially along
the shoreline of Lake Lanier), and provides
downstream water supply to other communities.
Without adequate drawdown from Lanier,
for example, water supplies may be inadequate
to provide for all of Atlanta’s needs. Likewise,
water quality may be severely degraded because
of the inability to adequately dilute pollution
discharges from point and non-point sources
around Atlanta. This is especially true if instream
water volumes decline due to growing
off-stream demands.
Finally, the compact negotiating process itself
lacks robustness; technically, the compact
does not actually take effect until an allocation
formula can be agreed upon. Thus, instead of
agreeing on an institutional framework that can
collect, analyze, translate, and use information
to reach accord over allocation limits and water
uses, the negotiations have been targeted on first
determining a formula for allocation based on
need (Feldman, 2007). As we have seen in the
previous case on drought management in Georgia,
climate forecast information is being used
to enhance drought preparedness and impact
mitigation. Nevertheless, as noted in that case,
conservation measures in one state alone cannot
mitigate region-wide problems affecting large,
multi-state watersheds. The same holds true
for regional water supply dispute-resolution.
Until a cooperative decision-making platform
emerges whereby regional climate forecast data
can be used for conjoint drought planning, water
allocation prescriptions, and incorporation of