(Part 1)

JBTM Book Reviews
116
This early church practice of infant baptism, which has been rejected for almost five centuries
by those who affirm believer’s baptism, was practiced by the early church to forgive the
inheritance from Adam. In chapter 5, Robert Kolb surveys the Lutheran doctrine of original
sin, beginning with Martin Luther and including the contributions of Melanchthon, the
Formula of Concord, Chemnitz, Hütter, Gerhard, and Spener.
In chapter 6, “Original Sin in Reformed Theology,” Donald Macleod presents three key
elements: Adam’s freedom to fall, the covenant of works, and the withholding of restraining
grace. Macleod’s explanation of these elements, however, faces some challenges. Is
it consistent to call the view that Adam and Eve were endowed with “freedom of moral
choice” Pelagian then explain that the solution is found in Ames’ comment, “Man of his
own will freely fell from God” (130–31)? Macleod’s clarification reveals a possible inconsistency
in Reformed theology’s view, “Adam’s choice was foreordained as a free act, not
‘caused’ by any prior event or circumstance within the causal nexus (and, of course, the
divine decree itself is not part of the causal nexus)” (136). One wonders how an act can
be simultaneously foreordained and decreed, but free and uncaused. Also, Macleod cites
support for the covenant of works in the Westminster Confession, although he notes the
doctrine is not explicitly affirmed by Calvin, Zwingli, and Bullinger (131–33). The covenant
of works, of course, is a theological inference without explicit biblical support. In the chapter,
Macleod also considers humanity’s relationship to Adam, two views of imputation, and
the origin of the human soul.
In chapter 7, Thomas McCall surveys views of original sin in the writings of John Wesley
and a host of Wesleyan theologians. The eighteenth century saw in Wesley, Watson,
and Wakefield interpretations of original sin which were largely identical to the Calvinist
interpreters, except for the innovations of prevenient grace and unlimited atonement. In
the nineteenth century, Pope advocated a federalist view, but Summers and Miley both
advocated a mediate view of imputation, which affirms inherited corruption but denies
inherited guilt. Their rejection of the imputed guilt is rooted in their affirmation of moral
responsibility and freedom. McCall’s essay characterizes the continued movement among
twentieth-century Wesleyans away from the “classic doctrine,” a phrase used in the book
to refer to the Augustinian view which later becomes the branch of Reformed theology affirming
inherited guilt (the immediate view). McCall’s chapter closes with the ominous
mention of the rise among Methodists of process philosophy (163). If that is the case, then
those Wesleyans are moving away from the Reformed/immediate view as well as Christian
orthodoxy.
Part 2 concludes with a chapter by Carl Trueman, who summarizes and critiques the
views of original sin of the following six modern theologians: Schleiermacher, Rauschenbusch,
Barth, Bultmann, Niebuhr, and Pannenberg. All of the thinkers reject both the relevance
of a historical Adam and the doctrine of alien guilt. Trueman rightly observes that
“one’s understanding of original sin is necessarily and decisively connected to the structure