Legal empowerment for local resource control

account is shaped by power relations between their holders. However, the
principle of equal protection before the law is in practice constrained by
extralegal factors. Differences in power and resources may result in
different interests enjoying different degrees of legal protection, and in
protection granted in theory not being translated into practice.
Therefore, the effectiveness of using legal and para-legal tools as a means for
empowerment is likely to be inversely proportional to the scale of the power
asymmetries: the greater the asymmetries, the more difficult it is to redress
them through legal processes (or through other processes, for that matter);
the lesser the asymmetries, the less likely it is that they can significantly affect
the application of the law, and the more likely that legal processes can be
used to redress them.
The effectiveness of legal and para-legal tools is also likely to be linked to the
relative importance of the different sources of power represented in Figure 1.
Where differences in power are mainly derived from social, economic,
cultural and political factors (see Table 3 above), using legal and para-legal
tools is unlikely to be enough: they can only help if combined with other
strategies that address those factors (e.g. social mobilisation).
These considerations suggest that legal empowerment is a complex and
non-linear process. Local groups may use a range of legal and para-legal
tools to strengthen their negotiating power and have greater control over
their lives. This entails pursuing the formal operation of the law (e.g.
community land registration, litigation); and/or undertaking negotiations in
the shadow of the law – where existing or advocated legal entitlements are
used as a source of negotiating power and as a lever to induce change in
the behaviour of other negotiating parties. Outcomes depend on legal
entitlements and negotiating power, and on the use that different
stakeholders make of their entitlements and power.
Local groups may feel that cooperation with the central state and foreign
investors gives them greater benefits than confrontation to assert their
rights and tough negotiating positions. Internal divisions within local
groups, possibly exacerbated by buying-offs from outsiders, may undermine
the exercise of legal entitlements. Foreign investors may support local
empowerment efforts, for instance because they feel that cooperation with
local groups reduces non-commercial project risks; or may oppose those
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