The Global Water Crisis: Addressing an Urgent Security - Unu-inweh ...

Office can still be driving forces behind water allocation. This has been materialized for instance, through a Presidential
Decree 5 denying the core principles of the Law.
Thus, there are early indications that the state may not be as dedicated to changing governance in the water sector as
it is inclined to resume its own hydraulic agenda of building dams and improving canal infrastructures. Likewise, early
signs indicate that local institutions do not adapt swiftly and smoothly in accordance with the spirit of the Law (Thomas
et al., forthcoming).
However, what the field results also indicate is that despite defying the governance principles of the Water Law, the
institutional arrangements at work in 2011 led to relatively positive, although limited, outcomes in terms of water access
for downstream water users. An analysis of the factors that triggered these positive outcomes even suggests that a strict
application of the promoted policy models (i.e. decentralization and devolution of decision-making power to water users)
may be counter-productive for water access in downstream areas, at least in the short term. In other words, what may be
gained in terms of ‘good water governance’ may come at a cost in terms of water access results (Thomas et al., forthcoming).
An overarching criticism is that most of the efforts have been focused on the development of national strategies, laws,
policies and regulations in a country where the impact of national law is limited at the local level when it comes to water
management. Thus, in their endeavour, the government and its foreign advisors have largely failed to appear as a relevant
and legitimate actor to resolve practical water management issues. Consequently, not only do traditional institutions
continue to function or evolve independently along their own path, often outside the realm of the reform framework,
but their buy-in vis-à-vis new governance mechanisms is also still very limited.
One recommendation would be to start working more closely with existing institutions on the resolution of practical
problems related to water allocation rather than superimposing new organizations and regulations. And although it
may be too early to begin critiquing the effectiveness of the efforts invested for improving governance in river basin
management, it may however be wise to start questioning whether the governance principles forming the pillars of the
Water Law are genuinely endorsed by local actors.
While the Water Law may in theory promote integration, what can be observed in reality is rather a turf-battle between
ministries. As a case in point, the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and
Livelihoods (MAIL) could not agree under which ministry Water User Associations would fall. As a result, each Ministry
has its own association (Irrigation Association under MAIL, and Water User Association under MEW) following different
regulations and creating confusion both on paper and in practice. This separation does not respond to practical considerations
for farmers on the ground. In fact, it may find its motivation elsewhere. As a senior and key informant from the MEW
points out: “The only interest of MEW and MAIL in having water user associations under their responsibility is because
they can have associated infrastructure projects. Most people in these ministries have construction companies involved
in the rehabilitation and construction work of different projects” (as quoted in Thomas et al., forthcoming).
3.4. Infrastructure first, governance later? Diverging from the imported model
In the 1960s-1970s prior to the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was engaged in a hydraulic mission with priority given to
developing water resources through large-scale infrastructure projects, including dams and irrigation schemes. This era
was put to a stop in the early 1980s. In the early 2000s, under the influence of international donors, a strong shift towards
‘good water governance’ principles was initiated (Thomas et al., forthcoming).
Yet, if on paper IWRM, RBM and participation in management is put forward, the MEW has yet to let go of its ambitions
of dam construction, irrigation expansion and hydropower generation. For instance, in 2008, the Water Sector Strategy
(2008) listed no less than 45 programmes and projects for the Water Sector for a total cost of almost US $3.8 million.
Close to 80% of the costs are attributed to dams (mainly medium- to large-sized) and canal infrastructure rehabilitation.
Multilateral donors have so far been reluctant to support these large-scale infrastructure ambitions (in part due to
5 This document has not been published. It is an order (n°1406) signed by President Hamid Karzai and endorsed by the Ministry of Energy and Water
(MEW), the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), the Supreme Court
and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). For a detailed description of the content and for an analysis of the process of making this decree, see Thomas et
al., (forthcoming).
Water Governance Reform in Afghanistan: Early Lessons for a Water-secure Future
Part 2
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