The Global Water Crisis: Addressing an Urgent Security - Unu-inweh ...

2.4. Water, conflicts, and institutions
In their 2009 report on Climate Change and Security in Africa, Brown and Crawford (2009: 6) summarized their review of
emerging policy reports on the security implications of climate change by emphasising that “[l]ike much research about
the links between environmental change and security, the literature on climate change and conflict tends to focus on
the structural conditions in which conflict emerges, such as scarcity of a resource, rather than the role of individuals and
institutions in initiating, sustaining, resisting or resolving conflict”. They conclude that according to Barnett and Adger
(2007), “it [that is, the research] tends to downplay the short-term causes (or triggers) of conflict and the importance of
human decisions – the choices made by individual ‘actors’ in a conflict” (Brown and Crawford, 2009: 6).
Thus, at a fundamental level, conflict originates from the interaction between individuals and moves towards their
surrounding environment in general. “Conflict is therefore mostly rooted in the ‘micro’ level. The way these conflicts
evolve depends highly on the availability and the functioning of local level institutions or mechanisms” (Bildhäuser, 2010:
2). Likewise, the effects of climate change and water hazards will principally be felt locally by individuals, families, villages,
and neighbourhoods. The diversity of climate change and hazards effects and of how individuals, households, villages,
governments, and civil society deal with them are best understood through an analysis of their local circumstances. Crucial
in that regard is the adaptive capacity of people and communities, mediated through institutions. Adaptation to climate
change and water hazards cannot be effective without robust institutions.
Having said this, it is obvious that the understanding of climate change as a threat multiplier at the same time implies that
strong and effective institutions and conflict prevention measures could function as threat minimisers. As emphasized by
Scheffran and Battaglini (2011: 30), the marginal impact of climate change can make a big difference, particularly in less
wealthy regions and in societies on the edge of instability: “[b]y triggering a cycle of environmental degradation, economic
decline, social unrest and political instability, climate change may become a crucial issue in security and conflict”, particularly
by overburdening states and regions which are already conflict prone and/or affected by fragile statehood and which are
characterized by an overlapping of diverse and competing logics of political and social order and behaviour (European
Commission, 2008; Boege, 2009). A spillover of state weakness-induced security risks (e.g. social unrest, refugee flows,
separation movements, warlordism) can contribute to destabilization processes, which could, according to WBGU, lead to
the geographical expansion of a local crisis and to an overstretching of global and regional governance structures (WBGU,
2007b). Brown and Crawford (2009: 2) rightly state that “it is non-climate factors (such as poverty, governance, conflict
management, regional diplomacy and so on) that will largely determine whether and how climate change moves from
being a development challenge to presenting a security threat”. Climate change or disaster triggered socio-economic and
political stress might therefore “erode the functioning of communities, the effectiveness of institutions and the stability
of societal structures” as indicated by Scheffran and Battaglini (2011: 29).
Hence, robust and sophisticated institutions at all administrative levels seem to be key to mitigating the aforementioned
risks of an increase in climate-induced water conflicts. Although Tir and Stinnet (2012), who undertook an in-depth analysis
of 315 river cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2002, found evidence for a higher risk of militarized
conflicts under conditions of water scarcity, they could show on the other hand that “the more institutionalized the river
treaty, the lower the likelihood of militarized conflict between the river treaty signatory states” (Tir and Stinnet, 2012:
220). They conclude that “[h]ighly institutionalized river treaties […] provide mechanisms for managing disputes before
they escalate” and “that international institutions could be useful tools for some of the predicted consequences of
climate change, such as water scarcity and changes in the seasonal flow patterns of rivers“ (Tir and Stinnet, 2012: 223).
This serves as an excellent example of the necessity, but also of the functioning, of robust institutions at the government
and international, or rather the ‘macro’, level.
The same applies to the local or ‘micro’ level. Recent research results from Adano et al. (2012) and from Theissen (2012)
showed that the likelihood for violent conflicts at the local level is higher in wetter seasons than in dry seasons, corroborating
the academic discourse about the importance of local, often traditional institutions or regimes for conflict resolution and
natural resources management (see Kramm and Wirkus, 2010; Boege, 2009 and 2006; Swatuk and Wirkus, 2009). They do
so by pointing to the role of socially-embedded institutions and customary rules, which especially facilitate the survival
of families, clans, villages and tribes in rural areas by managing access to natural resources and land, especially during
drought periods or in water-scarce regions, and by mediating conflictive situations through traditionally accepted means
(see Kramm and Wirkus, 2010; Boege 2009; Swatuk and Wirkus, 2009).
Water, Climate Change and Human Security: Conflict and Migration
Part 1
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