Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Witt & Tani, TCPI 4. Negligence Standard
the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the various
agencies or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every
defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. This, we think, places upon them the
burden of initial explanation. . . .
The number of those in whose care the patient is placed is not a good reason for denying
him all reasonable opportunity to recover for negligent harm. It is rather a good reason for reexamination
of the statement of legal theories which supposedly compel such a shocking result.
We do not at this time undertake to state the extent to which the reasoning of this case
may be applied to other situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. We
merely hold that where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of
medical treatment, all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities
which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of
negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.
The judgment is reversed.
3. Federal Constitutional Constraints on the Burden of Proof
Legislatures have sometimes sought to alter burdens of proof and persuasion. In response,
some courts have suggested constitutional limits on legislative alterations of the proof process.
For example, in Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910), the
petitioner, a railroad company, challenged a Mississippi statute that provided:
In all actions against railroad companies for damages done to persons or property,
proof of injury inflicted by the running of the locomotives or cars of such company
shall be prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care on the part of
the servants of the company in reference to such injury. This section shall also
apply to passengers and employes of railroad companies.
MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1906, § 1985 (1906). The petitioner claimed that the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause, depriving railroad companies “of the general rule of law which places
upon one who sues in tort the burden of not only proving an injury, but also that the injury was the
consequence of some negligence in respect of a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Id. at 42. The Court,
however, ruled against the petitioner, holding:
Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the main fact in issue is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general
power of government. Statutes, National and state, dealing with such methods of
proof in both civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding them are
numerous. . . .
The statute does not, therefore, deny the equal protection of the law or otherwise
fail in due process of law, because it creates a presumption of liability, since its
operation is only to supply an inference of liability in the absence of other evidence
contradicting such inference.
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