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Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

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Witt & Tani, TCPI 9. Liability without Fault?<br />

confine <strong>and</strong> control animals in light of their characteristics. Mr. Rhodes’s unfortunate excursion<br />

with Mr. MacHugh’s ram does not persuade us that the limited scope of strict liability that<br />

Washington has historically imposed on the owners of domestic animals should be enlarged. 4<br />

Affirmed.<br />

Note<br />

1. Wild animals. Tort law holds possessors of wild animals to the same level of<br />

responsibility as possessors of abnormally dangerous animals. In the Restatement formulation:<br />

“A possessor of a wild animal is subject to liability to another for harm done by the animal to the<br />

other, his person, l<strong>and</strong> or chattels, although the possessor has exercised the utmost care to confine<br />

the animal, or otherwise prevent it from doing harm.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §<br />

507(1) (1977). Note that as with abnormally dangerous animals, the possessor of a wild animal is<br />

not strictly liable for any harm that the animal causes—only “harm that results from a dangerous<br />

propensity that is characteristic of wild animals of the particular class, or of which the possessor<br />

knows or has reason to know.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 507(2) (1977). Can you<br />

imagine a concrete scenario in which this language would allow a possessor of a wild animal to<br />

avoid being held strictly liable for an injury the animal caused?<br />

C. Abnormally Dangerous Activities<br />

Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1969)<br />

FULD, C.J.<br />

The principal question posed on this appeal is whether a person who has sustained<br />

property damage caused by blasting on nearby property can maintain an action for damages<br />

without a showing that the blaster was negligent. Since 1893, when this court decided the case of<br />

Booth v. Rome, Watertown <strong>and</strong> Ogdensburg Terminal Railroad, 140 N.Y. 267 (1893), it has been<br />

the law of this State that proof of negligence was required unless the blast was accompanied by an<br />

actual physical invasion of the damaged property—for example, by rocks or other material being<br />

cast upon the premises. We are now asked to reconsider that rule.<br />

The plaintiff Spano is the owner of a garage in Brooklyn which was wrecked by a blast<br />

occurring on November 27, 1962. There was then in that garage, for repairs, an automobile owned<br />

by the plaintiff Davis which he also claims was damaged by the blasting. Each of the<br />

plaintiffs brought suit against the two defendants who, as joint venturers, were engaged in<br />

constructing a tunnel in the vicinity pursuant to a contract with the City of New York. The two<br />

cases were tried together, without a jury, in the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York<br />

County, <strong>and</strong> judgments were rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The judgments were reversed by<br />

the Appellate Term <strong>and</strong> the Appellate Division affirmed that order, granting leave to appeal to this<br />

court.<br />

489

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