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Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

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Witt & Tani, TCPI 5. Plaintiffs’ Conduct<br />

The judgment of the Appellate Division <strong>and</strong> that of the Trial Term should be reversed, <strong>and</strong><br />

a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.<br />

POUND, CRANE, LEHMAN, KELLOG, <strong>and</strong> HUBBS, JJ., concur.<br />

O’BRIEN, J., dissents . . .<br />

Notes<br />

1. Negligence in the Flopper case? What, if anything, did the operator of the Flopper do<br />

wrong? If the answer is nothing, then why are we talking about the plaintiff’s conduct? Isn’t this<br />

a case in which the plaintiff loses simply because he cannot show negligence on the part of the<br />

defendant?<br />

2. Primary assumption of the risk. Flopper-like cases are often said to deal with “primary<br />

assumption of risk.” As the California Supreme Court has put it,<br />

these are instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal<br />

conclusion that there is “no duty” on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff<br />

from a particular risk—the category of assumption of risk that the legal<br />

commentators generally refer to as “primary assumption of risk.”<br />

Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 701 (Cal. 1992). But if that is so, why craft an independent<br />

doctrine for such cases? Why aren’t these simply dealt with as cases in which the plaintiff wins<br />

because the defendant did not breach a duty of care?<br />

3. A monster flopper? Cardozo observes in the Flopper case that the outcome might be<br />

different “if the accidents had been so many as to show that the game in its inherent nature was<br />

too dangerous to be continued without change.” One New Jersey theme park in the 1980s <strong>and</strong><br />

1990s may have been such a place. Customers reported 14 broken bones <strong>and</strong> 26 head injuries in<br />

1984 <strong>and</strong> 1985. The park acquired its own ambulance. Six people died at the park between 1978<br />

<strong>and</strong> 1996. Test dummies used to simulate rides were said to come out decapitated. One teenage<br />

customer recalled driving to the park with his friends. “It wasn’t ‘If someone gets hurt,’” he<br />

recalled, “it was ‘Who’s going to get hurt?’” Another long-time customer remembered “People<br />

were bleeding all over the place.” Did the notoriety <strong>and</strong> visible dangerousness of Action Park<br />

mean that its ordinary operation was not negligent as a matter of law? Or was Action Park so<br />

dangerous that people should not have been allowed to assume the risks it posed? Notably, a<br />

young New Jersey man named Cory Booker loved the place. “I’ve got stories 2 tell,” he tweeted<br />

in 2014. See James Barron, People Were Bleeding All Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2019.<br />

4. The fellow servant rule. Historically, many cases of primary assumption of the risk dealt<br />

with workplace risks. Workers in the pre-worker’s compensation era were regularly said to<br />

assume the risks of the work in which they were engaged. In Lamson v. American Ax & Tool Co.,<br />

for example, the plaintiff was a painter of hatchets in the defendant’s manufacturing<br />

271

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