Torts - Cases, Principles, and Institutions Fifth Edition, 2016a

Witt & Tani, TCPI 8. Duty Problem
Siegrist contends that he is not liable for failure to obtain medical assistance for Farwell
because he had no duty to do so.
Courts have been slow to recognize a duty to render aid to a person in peril. Where such a
duty has been found, it has been predicated upon the existence of a special relationship between
the parties; in such a case, if defendant knew or should have known of the other person’s peril,
he is required to render reasonable care under all the circumstances. . . .
Farwell and Siegrist were companions on a social venture. Implicit in such a common
undertaking is the understanding that one will render assistance to the other when he is in peril if
he can do so without endangering himself. Siegrist knew or should have known when he left
Farwell, who was badly beaten and unconscious, in the back seat of his car that no one would find
him before morning. Under these circumstances, to say that Siegrist had no duty to obtain
medical assistance or at least to notify someone of Farwell’s condition and whereabouts would be
“shocking to humanitarian considerations” and fly in the face of “the commonly accepted code of
social conduct.” Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1947) [(finding that a host had
an affirmative duty to try to rescue a guest who had fallen off the host’s yacht)]. “[C]ourts will
find a duty where, in general, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it
exists.” Prosser, supra, § 53, at 327.
Farwell and Siegrist were companions engaged in a common undertaking; there was a
special relationship between the parties. Because Siegrist knew or should have known of the peril
Farwell was in and could render assistance without endangering himself he had an affirmative
duty to come to Farwell’s aid.
The Court of Appeals is reversed and the verdict of the jury reinstated.
Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993)
This case arises upon a reversal by the court of appeals of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant. The court of appeals held that defendant, the owner and operator of a private boat
on Lake Minnetonka, had a duty to warn plaintiff, a guest on the boat, that water surrounding the
boat was too shallow for diving. We reverse and reinstate judgment in favor of defendant.
The facts are undisputed for the purpose of this appeal. On Sunday, August 9, 1986,
Jeffrey Harper (“Harper”) was one of four guests on Theodor Herman’s (“Herman”) 26-foot boat,
sailing on Lake Minnetonka. Harper was invited on the boat outing by Cindy Alberg Palmer,
another guest on Herman’s boat. Herman and Harper did not know each other prior to this boat
outing. At the time Herman was 64 years old, and Harper was 20 years old. Herman was an
experienced boat owner having spent hundreds of hours operating boats on Lake Minnetonka
similar to the one involved in this action. As owner of the boat, Herman considered himself to be
in charge of the boat and his passengers. Harper had some experience swimming in lakes and
rivers, but had no formal training in diving.
After a few hours of boating, the group decided to go swimming and, at Herman’s
suggestion, went to Big Island, a popular recreation spot. Herman was familiar with Big Island,
and he was aware that the water remains shallow for a good distance away from its shore. Harper
had been to Big Island on one previous occasion. Herman positioned the boat somewhere
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