TBS 2-67 Cruisebook_Updated_7Jan23

A Year in the Provinces
obviously doomed. Why doomed? They’d given Giap’s
artillery the high ground. Results suggest shooting down
works better than shooting up.
Colonel Charles Piroth, the French artillery
commander, hadn’t feared the mountain heights
surrounding Dien Bien Phu. No way to haul anything up
them but light weapons, he offered; and the Viet Minh
would never get more than three rounds off from lower
elevations before his own artillery would have located,
targeted, and destroyed them. But the Viet Minh did.
Their success was signaled by a barrage that went on for
three days, shredding everything French poking above
ground. When it stopped, Piroth walked to all his gun sites,
shaking hands with his gunners before returning to his
bunker, laying down on his cot and pulling the pin on a
grenade that he then set on his chest.
Once quiet and isolated, Khe Sanh started to get noisy
and crowded. Recon teams scouting north of the airstrip
found bivouac sites for large units, not the usual NVA
patrols. Nevertheless, with strategy differences continuing
between Walt and Westmoreland, reports back from Khe
Sanh were tailored to fit somebody’s preconceived view
rather than Gaip’s. The only clear­sighted view of evolving
events came from Capt Sayers (Bravo 1/9), who commanded
the “standing” infantry company at the base. Mostly due to
Sayers’ persistence, Walt ordered Marines to reopen
highway 9 from Camp Carroll to Khe Sanh and sent a Rough
Rider convoy through. Marine engineers were added.
(Giap’s were there already, up on Hill 861.)
Bruno Hochmuth, commanding the 3rdMarDiv,
spoke no French but he understood high ground. What he
got right was the need to seize and hold the hilltops
surrounding Khe Sanh. After the first sharp engagement on
the hills he didn’t wait for a second before taking the
initiative. Now reinforced by Echo 2/9, up the Marines
went, first to Hill 861. Their approach to the summit, now a
formidable complex of interconnecting caves and bunkers
defended by heavy automatic weapons, signaled that the
NVA’s benign neglect of Khe Sanh had ended. It was 23
April, and whatever was to happen had begun.
***
Bravo Co’s point platoon up the hill was led by 2 nd Lt. J.D.
Carter. Spotting a squad of NVA soldiers wending their
way in his direction, he made Paddy Collins proud by
setting in a hasty ambush. (What else?) But as others
were to learn, the NVA he spotted weren’t a random
patrol, they were screening a much larger force of NVA.
Whoops! – back down the hill. Up again the next day went
Carter, but not in enough strength to hold it. After a
series of engagements Carter dug in on the slope; the last
med‐evac bird had taken 35 hits. Back and forth they
pushed and shoved, but by then somebody had correctly
identified J.D.’s opponents: the 18 th Regiment of the 325‐C
NVA Division – Giap’s paladins.
The CH‐46s that hauled out casualties brought in
3/3. By the 27 th LtCol. Gary Wilder had gotten his
battalion CP to the top of 861, but not with enough
strength to
stay. With mounting casualties (43 dead and 109 wounded)
Wilder pulled off the peak, but only so Marine Air could
pound away. They unloaded over 50,000 lbs of bombs and
A‐13