TBS 2-67 Cruisebook_Updated_7Jan23

John Burwell Wilkes
able to play a trumpet. When I returned from Hawaii, I gave him
custody of the trumpet and told him to aim it at LtCol Foxworth’s
hooch and play reveille in the morning and taps in the evening when
the battery was in Ca Lu. He did taps well, but reveille was terrible. Of
course, we did not engage the trumpet out on operations.
Christmas Day of 1968 was a very memorable day at Ca Lu. We
were able to grill and eat wonderful steaks sent from “back in the
world,” as the troops would say. At Ca Lu, my hooch and exec pit was
a sandbagged CP (command post) tent. As I returned from a meeting
at division HQ, I was astounded and humbled to find a decorated fourfoot­high
Christmas tree in my hooch. To this day no one ever took
credit for placing it there or ever told me from where it had been
stolen. There was a makeshift SNCO club of sorts somewhere in the
area. I strongly suspected that it was probably where SSgt Geiler had
appropriated it, but I never tried to prove it.
Circa that Christmas, I had an experience at Ca Lu that caused me to
refuse a direct order from a superior officer. I have not regretted this
disobedience because I think it most likely saved the lives of some
American soldiers. It happened one night while I was trying to get
some sleep and Lt. Ferrari was on the hook to the guns just a few feet
away from my cot. Normally, the executive officer gets the gun data
from the Fire Direction Center (FDC), transfers it to the guns, then
gives the order to fire when all is reported ready. In my view, Ferrari
was still a bit on probation to handle this responsibility by himself.
A fire mission came down from the Third Division COC in
Dong Ha. It had originated from an Army unit that was getting probed.
So, I listened pretending to be asleep. I realized from the deflections
and range given to the guns that the soldiers calling for the fire were
on the gun target line. I heard the warning “danger close” come from
the FDC, and I started to get nervous, but all seemed to be correct with
the adjusting process. They were using HE rounds and the gunners
were splitting mils for accuracy to bring the rounds in close to the
friendly lines. When the mission went to “Fire For Effect,” I heard the
command “LOAD FIRECRACKER”, and I catapulted off the cot,
grabbed the hook from the exec, and hollered “CHECK FIRE” loud
enough for the guns to hear it without the section chiefs’ earphones. I
then got the Division on the radio and told them I could not shoot their
mission. A voice purportedly from a full colonel who apparently had
the watch, gave me a direct order to fire the mission as requested. I
politely refused and told him that, no matter how accurate my FDC
and gunners were, FIRECRACKER was an area weapon and not all
that accurate, and the requested fire for effect was four rounds from
each gun and too unreliable to use in a danger close situation with
friendly soldiers on the gun/target line.
The big 155 millimeter FIRECRACKER rounds were filled with
many little bomblets that were ejected from the rear of the shell by a
time fuse, hopefully over the target. They then floated on little wings,
subject to wind, until close to the ground to detonate. I told him I
could not fire what had been requested unless the Army unit was being
overrun, and I understood they were only being probed. The colonel
was not fazed and told me that we had to give the Army what they
requested. He somehow implied there would be consequences, which I
presumed to be relief from command for cause, and maybe even a
court martial, if I didn’t comply. The argument was more drawn out,
but I finally proposed a compromise. We would shoot one Firecracker
round to see how it worked. We fired the one round and the result was
A‐68