TBS 2-67 Cruisebook_Updated_7Jan23

Khe Sanh
of the wire. Nevertheless, it takes time to move a regiment
(66 th ) from its staging area to its release positions. Too long,
as it were. SOG had sown the area west of the base with
noise sensors. Once the NVA began to assemble their
assault regiment, they were heard. Just like a base­stealer
timing the pitcher, the NVA had calculated their time to get
from their staging areas to their trenches. As to Khe Sanh’s
response time, they could only guess. They guessed wrong;
misjudged the flexibility of the air commander in diverting
flights of B­52s and putting them on radar, over the 66 th
NVA regiment.
His second error was predictable: his hubris argued
the little ARVN Rangers wouldn’t fight, so he threw his
assault regiment right at them. In moving up, the 66th had
gotten pounded by two B­52s and Marine arty dumped a
thousand rounds on their heads. Then right at the wire the
little ARVN rangers stung them hard. Marines followed
with bayonets.
One now hears of the main assault that never came.
Nonsense. A regiment certainly was sent in headlong
attack. That it got chewed up along the way and repulsed at
the wire does not signify a failure to attack; it signifies a
failure of the attack.
Within ten days the 325C NVA division folded tents.
There would be many to laud at Khe Sanh for bravery
and perseverance. Omitted are the names of Col. Lounds
and MajGen McTomkins – neither thanked (nor promoted).
Oh, the 26 th Marines were heralded – and rightfully so.
(There hadn’t been, as Johnson put it, no “dinbinfoo.”) As
most battles carry with them their own set of scars and
identifying marks, so too, did Khe Sanh. For wives sporting
a Marine­aviator husband, give the old boy a kiss. They
were magnificent. So, too, the kids on the ground. It’s fair
to remember, though, that when hit, infantrymen could hit
back. Likewise, artillerymen would give as good as they got.
Ah, but the engineers… when NVA gunners caught them
out gluing down the marston matting every morning or reopening
a supply lane, all they could do was thank the Lord
for what they were about to receive and pick up the pace.
***
Given that two near simultaneous battles exploded,
Khe Sanh and Tet, it’s irresistible for some people not to
point to one or the other as the primary objective and the
other as a head fake. Khe Sanh gets further cast as a tactical
ploy of Westmorland’s, as if he, not Giap, unnecessarily
forced a fight. Reason rebuts that with the singular image of
a PT­76 tank sitting on top of SOG’s command bunker at
Lang Vai. If Giap wasn’t really there to fight, what was he
doing there with multiple divisions, heavy artillery, siege
mortars, and tanks? Should we really suppose that
Westmorland had crafted Giap’s field of dreams?
The simple answer works best: Giap miscalculated.
And in remaining handcuffed to his own narrow experience
and wide biases, he repeated the same trick – days later.
A‐36