Redesigning Animal Agriculture

not show sufficient respect to animal dignity
or animal integrity. In fact it does not matter
whether it is dignity or integrity that is the
object of respect. By tying the analysis to the
norm of ethical respect, these authors wind
up with a result that is very much like the
argument already discussed in connection
with animal rights views, which require that
one show respect for animals’ subjectivity,
for their being the subject of a life. We may
concede that the act of depriving a being that
has subjectivity of its ability to experience
a state of well-being fails to show respect,
but how can the use of an organism that has
no subjectivity be understood as a lack of
respect. It seems that we would show greater
recognition of and respect for the dignity or
integrity of creatures that have dignity or
integrity by leaving them alone and using an
organism that lacks (and has always lacked)
the basis for dignity or integrity, which must
certainly have something to do with ability
to experience its own life.
Yet another philosophical strategy has
been deployed by Henk Verhoog and by
Allan Holland, both of whom argue that the
problem with altering telos cannot be analysed
as a form of harm or lack of respect
either to individual animals or to the species
as a whole. Rather each sees the wrongness
in these practices residing in how they
affect human beings. Verhoog argues that
these practices threaten the intellectual
coherence of the way that we understand
human relationships with other animals
(Verhoog, 1993). Holland argues that this
type of transgenic work adopts a totally
instrumental attitude toward animal life,
an attitude that runs contrary to the respect
that human beings should show towards
living beings, conscious or not (Holland,
1995). Both of these approaches could be
reconciled with the previous suggestion
that intuitions in the blind chicken case
are actually relying on a virtues approach
in ethics, one that operates somewhat independently
of the way that human actions
are understood as being unacceptable when
they violate moral constraints (e.g. rights) or
produce harmful consequences.
For his part, Rollin has responded to
these criticisms mainly by reiterating his
Ethics of Livestock Science 41
original view. He finds the idea that altering
telos itself is immoral, inconsistent
with centuries of human domestication of
animals, and hence simply a case of poor
ethical reasoning. He has analysed the
types of argument offered by Verhoog and
Holland as making ‘aesthetic’ rather than
ethical objections to biotechnology. Here,
Rollin accepts that consumers may resist
such products, but argues that they are not
doing so on moral grounds (Rollin, 1998).
Only in a very brief paper responding to the
suggestion that challenging species in biomedical
research can be troubling to people
does Rollin admit the possibility that such
practices might be ethically problematic by
virtue of their potential to damage the way
that people think and speak to one another
about the idea of humanity and the place of
human beings in the broader world (Rollin,
2003a). Here, again, the moral logic of this
concern resides in the domain of virtues,
rather than that of rights or consequences.
Toward a more Pragmatic Ethic for
Livestock Research
All elements of the ethical debate – including
rights, virtues, benefits and harms – should
be considered when determining practices
in modern agricultural systems. We need
an approach opposite to the reductionist
approach. The animal welfare philosopher
needs to ensure that all elements are included
in the course of deliberation. Deliberation
should avoid a situation in which one element
dominates the others. Developing policy and
making choices mindful of all these elements
is an extremely complex process – there are
no easy reductionist formulas that encapsulate
all elements of the debate.
There are, for example, other ways in
which virtue-thinking influences public
attitudes toward contemporary agriculture.
Many people have become suspicious that
the use of animals in modern production
systems is driven by profit and efficiency
and not by a consideration of the wider
ethical framework (McNaughton, 2004). My
general sense is that the majority of people