BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee

Protection
Investigations conducted by the LAS Supervisors Conference have concluded that implementation of LAS standards
for the treatment of Palestinians in member states is poor, and LAS monitoring and enforcement initiatives have
not produced significant or lasting improvements. Treatment accorded to Palestinian refugees in Egypt, Lebanon,
Libya, Kuwait and other Gulf states, in particular, is often similar to protection standards accorded to foreigners.
In contrast, Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have generally enjoyed relatively
favourable treatment by host country authorities.
National and regional political considerations often over-ride protection standards and result in very partial and
inconsistent protection of Palestinian refugees. Adherence to LAS standards has decreased, particularly since 1991,
when, in response to the PLO’s stand on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the LAS authorized states to treat Palestinian
refugees in accordance with domestic law. The weakness of the PLO, and concerns among Arab states about
international pressure for permanent resettlement of Palestinians in their territory, have led to further erosion of
regional and national protection regimes, especially since the 1993 Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel.
a. The right not to be expelled (non-refoulement)
The PLO and Refugee/IDP Protection
In 1974, the United Nations recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, most of whom are refugees. The PLO is the Palestinian organization mandated to search for a durable
solution based on the right of return. Although not a state party, the PLO has provided some protection for Palestinian refugees
in host countries. Historically, the PLO has protected Palestinian refugees through diplomatic interventions and political pressure
on relevant state authorities, and by offering access to health care, education and employment in its broad network of economic
and service institutions.
Protection provided by the PLO, however, has been susceptible to political developments in host countries. The 1969 Cairo Agreement,
for instance, regulated the status and freedom of the PLO in Lebanon and provided substantial protection to Palestinian refugees.
In 1982, however, the PLO was forced to leave Lebanon as part of a US-brokered cease-fire agreement with Israel, leaving behind
Palestinian refugees who lacked physical and political protection. During the late 1970s, and again in the 1980s, relations between
Egypt and the PLO declined, leaving Palestinians with less effective protection in that country. For instance, the preferential treatment
given to Palestinian refugees in the field of education and employment were withdrawn. Nevertheless, the PLO intervened with Egyptian
authorities on behalf of Palestinian university students who were sometimes deprived from sitting for their final exams at university and
paid the university fees of many of them. In the 1990s, Kuwait severed relations with and funding to the PLO in response to PLO support
for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with some 300,000 Palestinians being forced to leave the country as a result. Palestinians were also
expelled from Libya to punish the PLO for having signed the Oslo Accords with Israel. When US-led sanctions triggered a humanitarian
crisis in Iraq in the 1990s, the PLO approached UNRWA, UNHCR and other international organizations about the possibility of registering
Palestinian refugees in Iraq with UNRWA in order to improve the level of assistance. More recently, the PLO has called upon the US
(as an occupying power) and the Iraqi government to protect Palestinians in Iraq. It has offered to take Palestinian refugees from Iraq
into the occupied Palestinian territory, but the government of Israel has refused to allow such refugees to enter.
The 1993 Oslo Accords with Israel resulted in mutual recognition and the relocation of the PLO from exile to the Israeli-occupied
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Throughout the 1990s, PLO resources were mainly invested in building a Palestinian Authority,
which – pending a final peace agreement with Israel – was to become the government of a sovereign and independent state.
The de facto merger of the PLO with the PA resulted in the weakening of the PLO, which subsequently lost its ability to protect
Palestinian refugees in exile.
Palestinian refugees in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory came under the combined jurisdiction of the PA and the PLO, which
viewed the occupied territory as a host country for Palestinian refugees. However, the ability of national authorities to protect this
population, including refugees and IDPs, was limited from the beginning as a result of the limited powers granted to them under
the terms of the interim political agreements with Israel. The destruction of PA infrastructure by Israel since the beginning of the
second intifada in 2000, and the imposition of sanctions against the democratically elected Palestinian Authority in January 2006,
have severely curtailed the PA’s ability to protect refugees and IDPs in the occupied territory.
Arab host states have frequently violated the principle of non-refoulement, either by expelling Palestinian refugees
to the frontiers of territory where their lives and freedoms were threatened, or by denying entry to Palestinian
refugees fleeing persecution by another host state. Examples include the massive expulsion of Palestinians from
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