BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee

Politics and the Question of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs
should be that the Palestinian state will be the focal point for Palestinians who choose to return to the area, without
ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.” 23 The proposed agreement would recognize a right to return to
historic Palestine or a homeland consistent with the two-state solution, with five possible final homes for the refugees:
(1) the state of Palestine; (2) areas in Israel to be transferred to Palestine in a land swap; (3) rehabilitation in a host
country; (4) resettlement in a third country; (5) admission to Israel. 24 The agreement would “make clear that the return
to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the areas acquired in the land swap would be a right to all Palestinian refugees; while
rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies
of those countries.” 25 Hence, while a general right of return to historic Palestine would be recognized, the right of refugees
to return to their homes in Israel would not be recognized, and would be subject to “Israel’s sovereign decision.” 26 The
PLO insisted that “the essence of the right of return is choice: Palestinians should be given the option to choose where
they wish to settle, including return to the homes from which they were driven.” 27 According to the PLO, “the United
States’ proposal reflected a wholesale adoption of the Israeli position that the implementation of the right of return be
subject entirely to Israel’s discretion.” They also argued that the Parameters in fact constituted a setback compared to
the principles acknowledged in previous negotiations. 28 The Clinton Parameters failed to bring about agreement among
the parties, and the subsequent Bush regime did not pursue the initiative.
In the last round of peace negotiations at Taba, Egypt, in January 2001, the PLO initiated an exchange of “non-papers”
with the Israeli delegation. The PLO presented a schematic framework for durable solutions for Palestinian refugees, 29
which was generally consistent with international law, the terms of UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), and best
practice concerning durable solutions for refugees. Israel’s “private response” confirmed that a just settlement would
necessarily lead to the implementation of UN Resolution 194, but did not recognize a right of return. It laid out a
primarily politically-driven framework, which provided for implementation of a “wish to return ... in a manner consistent
with the existence of the state of Israel as the homeland for Jewish people”, components of which were inconsistent with
Resolution 194(III), as well as international law and practice. 30 The Taba negotiations ended inconclusively, and peace
negotiations came to a halt in 2001 with the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s new Prime Minister, and the subsequent
efforts to quell the second Palestinian uprising by military means.
In early 2002, the EU Special
Representative to the Middle East
Peace Process, Miguel Moratinos,
released another “non-paper”
summarizing the general content
of the Taba negotiations and the
positions of both parties on the
question of Palestinian refugees. 31
It adds some detail to the papers
presented by Israel and the PLO at
Taba. According to Moratinos, for
example, Israel proposed a 15-year
absorption program to facilitate
a limited return of Palestinian
refugees to Israel. The absorption
quota suggested by Israel ranged
from 25,000 refugees over three
years to 40,000 over five years;
i.e., less than one per cent of the
Palestinian refugee children from ‘Azza refugee camp commemorating the anniversary of the Nakba,
Bethlehem, occupied West Bank, 2003. © BADIL.
total Palestinian refugee population, while the right of the remaining 99% to exercise their individual right of
return would be withheld. Israeli negotiators also rejected the right of Palestinian refugees to restitution of their
properties.
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