Health sector reform in Mali, 1989-1996 - TropMed Central Antwerp ...
Health sector reform in Mali, 1989-1996 - TropMed Central Antwerp ...
Health sector reform in Mali, 1989-1996 - TropMed Central Antwerp ...
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32<br />
Table 6. The alternatives: global convention or specific contracts for each vertical<br />
programme<br />
Global convention Specific contracts<br />
Care<br />
• Access to care coverage • Balanced for the MPS<br />
• Last<strong>in</strong>g progress<br />
• Specific performance may<br />
be modest<br />
Studies <strong>in</strong> HSO&P,20,2003<br />
• Improvement for the<br />
specific activity of<br />
the contract<br />
• Specific results more<br />
rapid, but not last<strong>in</strong>g<br />
• MPS • Complete at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g • Incomplete if<br />
activities not covered<br />
by a contract<br />
• Quality of care • Favours global<br />
responsibility<br />
• To make the community<br />
accountable<br />
Development<br />
• The community and its<br />
needs constitute the<br />
reference frame<br />
• Partner<br />
• Cont<strong>in</strong>uity • The stakes are clear:<br />
survival of the ComHC<br />
• Motivation of personnel • Through responsibility for<br />
the ComHC and the whole<br />
community<br />
• Sense of ownership of the<br />
ComHC as a work<strong>in</strong>g tool<br />
• Premiums possible for<br />
performance and global<br />
quality of services<br />
• Favours programme<br />
performance but<br />
lacks <strong>in</strong>tegration<br />
• Reference to<br />
programmes and<br />
their technicians<br />
becomes<br />
predom<strong>in</strong>ate<br />
• Programme target<br />
• Threatened because<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ked to the<br />
successful execution<br />
of contracts<br />
• Double f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
always possible ow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to lack of<br />
transparency and<br />
isolated management<br />
re<strong>in</strong>forced by the<br />
perceived advantages<br />
a contract br<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
• Possibility of<br />
undesired effects<br />
with anomalous<br />
results if<br />
remuneration is<br />
based on<br />
performance without<br />
local control