Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...

108 BASTOGNE
the driver to make for Bastogne as fast as he could get there. & He
figured he was already surrounded-or just about so. A half hour
after he did come over the road, it was cut by the German armor. II
That was not, however, an unmixed evil, for it brought an
important change in the relationship of the forces in the defense.
During its first two days the infantry and the armor had collaborated
well but they had not been a team. On the first night, General
McAuliffe had asked that the armor (Combat Command B,
10th Armored Division) be attached to him and its commander
Colonel Roberts had said, 'What do you know about armor?"
General McAuliffe had replied, "Maybe you want the WIst
Division attached to your Combat Command."7
It was partly because of this division in the command authority,
and partly because the armor and the infantry were units·
strange and new to each other, that during the first stage there
was a lack of cohesion. 8 That lack was felt more as a moral than
as a tactical thing. To one staff officer of the Division the armor
along the front seemed "like a will 0' the wisp."s
The armor felt the same way about the infantry. Each force
had the feeling those first few days that it was propping up the
front pretty much unhelped. In general, neither force was feeling
the presence of the other strongly nor having a clear idea how
much support was being received from it. Liaison was fragmentary.
Both tankers and infantrymen had had to come out of
their comers fighting and during the first crucial hours they had
no choice but to look straight ahead and slug.
But with the cutting of the NeufcMteau road and the isolating
of the Bastogne garrison, General Middleton called General Mc­
Auliffe and told him that the armor (Combat Command B) and
all other troops within the circle were now under his command. 10
General Middleton also called Colonel Roberts and told him,
"Your work has been quite satisfactory but I have so many divisions
that I can't take the time to study two sets of reports from
the same area." Colonel Roberts reported in person to General
McAuliffe to do command liaison and from that time on until the
siege was lifted his post was almost exclUSively at the WIst Division
command post. The result was that the coordination was