Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...

THE. ENEMY STORY 179
terence produced on the minds of the subordinate commanders
is to be measured in the story of their separate actions and decisions.
In the attack of December 16 against the general American
front, the Corps attacked with 2d Panzer Division on the right
Hank and 26th Volksgrenadier Division on the left, and Panzer
Lehr Division in reserve. Penetrations into our lines having been
made, during December 17 the Panzer Lehr Division moved
ahead of the 26th Volksgrenadier (Map 25, page 178). On the
right, the northern bridgeheads across the Clerf and Our rivers
had been built by the 2d Panzer Division; these were the bridgeheads
enabling the movement of enemy forces along the road to
Longvilly. On the left the engineering units of the 26th Volksgrenadier
Division had done the necessary bridging to enable
Panzer Lehr to cross the Clerf and Our and push on for Bastogne.
The two southern bridgeheads opened onto secondary roads by
way of which Panzer Lehr could cut the lines of communication
south of Bastogne and attack the town initially from that direction.
The 2d Panzer Division advanced rapidly throughout that
day and the next day. Heavy resistance from our 28th Division
units in Clervaux slowed its pace on December 17; but after that
there was no check to the progress of the 2d Panzer Division
until it came almost to the road intersection to the east of Longvilly,
where it intended to veer north and proceed toward Noville.
In mid-afternoon of December 17, Liittwitz, the XXXXVII
Corps commander, visited his front lines where his armor was
pushing westward from the bridgeheads. He returned late in
the day to his CP near Karlshausen on the east bank of the Our
River to find a message from his communications officer lying
on his desk. It read that he had intercepted an AmeriCan radio
message saying that the American airborne divisions, then near
Reims, had been alerted for a fast movement to the battle area.
Liittwitz looked once more at the map and reasoned that they
would be sent to Bastogne.
To Liittwitz, this spoke volumes. In his own words: "Ever
since the Arnhem operation our command had feared another at-