Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...

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no BASTOGNE Now, on the 21st, McAuliffe knew that General Cota would not be coming to see him, and that the only situation involving American troops about which he would have to worry for a while was the situation right within the two-and-one-half mile circle of German forces closed around Bastogne. The only support he could expect for the time being was just what he had-all within ranging distance of his own 105mm. batteries. It was a nice, clear-cut position and it had materialized in just about the way that he had expected upon first reaching Bastogne. 15 But what he had not foreseen, something that came like a gift from the gods, was that after the first hard collision, the enemy would give him a comparative respite in which to reRect on his situation and knit his armor and infantry close together, now that both were his to work with as he saw fit. The Germans had spent two days trying to break on through Bastogne. They spent the next two riding hard around it. They had failed to crush it; they would try to choke it. But while they were building up around the west and south, the pressure against the city relaxed. 16 The Row of bubbles on the G-2 overlays, showing the extension of the enemy to the south and westward, was moving along. Panzer Lehr Division had been the first to break upon the Bastogne rock. But the 26th Volksgrenadier Division had also come in from the east. A captured map showed that it had failed in one of its appointments, for the 26th Volksgrenadier was to have had the honor of capturing Bastogne. l1 The Germans were traveling light. Their commanders had told them that Bastogne was bursting with American food and that they could eat when they got there. IS Some had gone hungry for three days while trying to reach the American rations. Too, the enemy fire power manifested a certain weakness. While his heavy mortars and nebelwerfers were shaking down the store fronts in Bastogne and wounding a few soldiers and civilians, his artillery effort was largely limited to the covering fires given by the tanks and the fire of a relatively few self-propelled guns when his infantry charged forward. This, G-2 attributed to a critical shortage of ammunition.19 The cutting of the NeufcbAteau road, closing the German
THE RESPITE 111 circle, appears in the WIst Division records as hardly more than an interesting incident. 20. Up till then, the Division's intelligence of the enemy strength and movements was more notable for its blanks than for its specific detailed entries. 21 The G-2 section had, of course, moved cold into an unknown situation and was having to build up its picture of the enemy and friendly forces piece by piece. There had been no pretty "estimates of the situation" to take over and build upon.22 All that Division could know for certain was what it learned from examining the enemy dead or questioning prisoners. That was enough for Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Danahy's (Division G-2-plate 29) main purpose and enough also to satisfy his taste for melodramatic utterance. Eleven dead men had been found on the ground where the hospital was captured. The corpses had civilian clothes-and German military dogtags. Colonel Danahy went out to make the identifications.2s A few hours after this find, a message from 10th Armored Division came through Combat Command B to WIst Division Headquarters saying, ''You can expect attacks from Sherman tanks, civilians and almost anything now."24 Reports came into the G-2 office through the first day of Germans killed while wearing American uniforms and of Sherman tanks pouring fire on our lines. Danahy checked up. He found that invariably, where the enemy used American dress, it was mixed with some of their own clothing, so that they could maintain they were in uniform. 25 What he had seen gave him fresh inspiration for prophecy. "Their equipment is augmented by captured U. S. equipment which they do not hesitate to use," he wrote to the commander. 211 "Their morale is excellent but will disintegrate as they come in contact with American airborne troops. It is well known that the Germans dislike fighting. The false courage acquired during their recent successes has so far proved insufficient to prevent their becoming road-bound."27 While this message was going out to the regiments of the 1 0 1 st, the enemy was crossing the NeufcMteau road and cutting the last line to the south, closing the circle around Bastogne. Recon-
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ASTOGNE THEFIRST EIGHTDAYS S. L. A.
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RUNNING BA'ITLE FmsT ACTION AT MARV
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UNITS, COMMANDERS, STAFF MEMBERS, A
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2D BA'ITALION (Companies D, E, F an
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54m ARMORED INPANTRY BATI'ALION (LE
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CHAPTER 1 THE SITUATION THE SIEGE O
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otal Extent of the Bulge [ 3 1
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THE SITUATION 5 penetrated the posi
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THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 9 tow
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14 BASTOGNE bat Command B continued
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16 BASTOGNE While there was still l
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THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 19 In
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THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE 21 th
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24 BASTOGNE tions over, Lieutenant
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28 BASTOGNE north and west and goin
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FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 31 nin
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36 BASTOGNE own fight. He had alrea
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38 BASTOGNE make it easily possible
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EAST OF BASTOGNE 41 someone walking
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EAST OF BASTOGNE 43 fire, his own t
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EAST OF BASTOGNE 45 O'Hara of Comba
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EAST OF BASTOGNE 47 Map 7
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50 BASTOGNE pressed in against the
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TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 53 clog the
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TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 55 knocked
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TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE 57 points o
Page 76 and 77: 60 BASTOGNE the power of the Gennan
Page 78 and 79: CHAPTER 8 ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL COL
Page 80 and 81: 64 BASTOGNE losses to the enemy. Fr
Page 82 and 83: 66 BASTOGNE Colonel Sink, having ca
Page 84 and 85: 68 BASTOGNE and decided thatthis mu
Page 86: 70 BASTOGNE denly realizing that it
Page 89 and 90: I T CHAPTER 10 THE REPULSE WAS A NI
Page 92: 76 BASTOGNE twenty minutes. 1o Pris
Page 96 and 97: 80 BASTOGNE pushing rightward towar
Page 98 and 99: 82 BASTOGNE of the darkness and the
Page 101: THE REPULSE 85 of the enemy were ca
Page 105 and 106: RUNNING BAITLE 89 drivers were alre
Page 108 and 109: 92 BASTOGNE ited attack forward to
Page 111: RUNNING BATTLE 95 tain William G. S
Page 114: 98 BASTOGNE aged or destroyed many
Page 117 and 118: FIRST ACTION AT MARVIE 101 At 1125,
Page 119: ACTION AT MARVIE 20 DECEMBER o soo
Page 122 and 123: 106 BASTOGNE During all that time,
Page 124 and 125: 108 BASTOGNE the driver to make for
Page 129: THE RESPITE 113 Later in the mornin
Page 132 and 133: 116 BASTOGNE Division Headquarters.
Page 134: 118 BASTOGNE The main event for tha
Page 138 and 139: 122 BASTOGNE slowly. The German inf
Page 142: 126 BASTOGNE provide a target for t
Page 146 and 147: 130 BASTOGNE stayed in their holes
Page 148: 132 BASTOGNE Higgins reasoned that
Page 153: CHAPTER 17 SUPPLIES ARRIVE 1 FROM D
Page 160 and 161: 144 BASTOGNE was always Team O'Hara
Page 163 and 164: CHAPTER 19 WEST OF BASTOGNE FOR SIX
Page 165: WEST OF BASTOGNE 149 they guessed t
Page 168 and 169: 152 BASTOGNE tered a small detachme
Page 170: 154 BASTOGNB left Bank of the high
Page 173: CHRISTMAS. EVE 157 usual pressure f
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160 BASTOGNE heavy aitillery fire a
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162 BASTOGNE pinned them down with
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164 BASTOGNE north and northwest. U
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BATTLE A1 CHAMPS ZS DECEMBER I PHAS
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CHRISTMAS EVE 169 of Champs, but by
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172 BASTOGNE tanks moved in among t
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THE ENEMY STORY 177 The onfall of X
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THE. ENEMY STORY 179 terence produc
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THE ENEMY STORY 183 he was constrai
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186 BASTOGNE at Neffe was something
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.... 00 00 Map 27: Destruction of t
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THE ENEMY STORY 191 concluded that
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THE ENEMY STORY 193 he was temporar
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198 BASTOGNE grenadier Division got
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KEY TO NOTES 201 M45A-Narrative Sum
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210 BASTOGNE 22 Kinnard and Danahy
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214 BASTOGNE and 84 enlisted men wo
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2. Colonel (now Brigadier Generall
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4. Brigadier General (now Major Gen
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6. Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Danah
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8. Lieutenant Colonel (now Colon el
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J 3 and J 4. Bomb damage in Bastogn
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16. Vehicle in Bastogne camouflaged
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[ 232 ]
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[ 234 ] .. •
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2 J. Neffe, scene of heavy flghting
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23 (top'. Wounded in the hospitals
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[ 240 ]
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[ 242]
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29. Command Post of Company F, 327t
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32 (top). Members of the 101 st Air
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37. Pine plantation near Bastogne,
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40. Men on guard in a pine plantati
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42. Colonel Danahy, General McAulif
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PIN:100429-000
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