Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
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FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY 31<br />
ning eastward-toward <strong>the</strong> ridges where Ewell had walked in<br />
November-although nei<strong>the</strong>r General Middleton nor General<br />
McAuliffe ever knew that he had seen <strong>the</strong> ground. T <strong>The</strong> enemy<br />
was coming that way. At Corps headquarters <strong>the</strong> 9th Armored<br />
Division was thought to have a roadblock somewhere around<br />
Longvilly and <strong>the</strong> 10th Armored Division a block far<strong>the</strong>r west<br />
toward Neffe. <strong>The</strong> 9th's block was thought to be surrounded;<br />
<strong>the</strong> 10th's block was supposed to be engaged but not yet surrounded.a<br />
General Middleton had described <strong>the</strong> situation at <strong>the</strong>se blocks<br />
when General McAuliffe had reported to him, and he had said:<br />
"<strong>The</strong>re is a battle now going on for <strong>Bastogne</strong>."9 He spoke <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
block out along <strong>the</strong> Longvilly road as "surrounded" and indicated<br />
<strong>the</strong> positions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three blocks which Combat Command<br />
B <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 10th Armored was maintaining to <strong>the</strong> east, nor<strong>the</strong>ast<br />
and sou<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> city.10 <strong>The</strong> Corps commander had no specific<br />
plan for <strong>the</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lOIst Division. <strong>The</strong> news that<br />
he was to have that division had come so recently that he had<br />
had no time to prepare a plan. At first General McAuliffe could<br />
think <strong>of</strong> nothing. ll At 2200 he suggested to General Middleton<br />
that a combat team be sent east to develop <strong>the</strong> situation.12 That<br />
idea appealed to General McAuliffe simply as a "good old leavenworth<br />
solution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem."lB It was wholly consistent with<br />
General Middleton's concern for <strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
elements <strong>of</strong> his command. uA As General Middleton reasoned<br />
<strong>the</strong> problem, so long as <strong>the</strong> 10th Armored team was already employed<br />
in <strong>the</strong> east, it was not urgent that <strong>the</strong> lOIst Airborne Division<br />
develop <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>the</strong>re, although it was sound practice<br />
to reinforce <strong>the</strong> armored team's roadblock, since it was becoming<br />
evident that <strong>the</strong> weight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy attack was coming down<br />
<strong>the</strong> Longvilly road. 14 ,B<br />
Middleton and McAuliffe sent for Ewell. He had been spending<br />
a pmt <strong>of</strong> his time unpr<strong>of</strong>itably at <strong>the</strong> road intersections trying<br />
to get information from men who were straggling in from <strong>the</strong><br />
north and nor<strong>the</strong>ast. All talked vaguely and dispiritedly. Man<br />
after man said to him: 'We have been wiped out," and <strong>the</strong>n stumbled<br />
away through <strong>the</strong> dark. <strong>The</strong>y did not know where <strong>the</strong>y had