Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
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THE SITUATION 5<br />
penetrated <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 14th Cavalry group three miles.<br />
Group reserves were committed and <strong>the</strong> I06th Division put out<br />
flank protection to <strong>the</strong> north. Through <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 106th<br />
Division <strong>the</strong> enemy advanced rapidly for a mile and a half, but<br />
<strong>the</strong>n as reserves were brought up his progress was slowed. <strong>The</strong><br />
German gains threatened to isolate two regiments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> I06th<br />
Division. Captured documents showed that on this day <strong>the</strong> enemy<br />
hoped to take St. Vith. This he did not do.<br />
Against <strong>the</strong> 28th Division <strong>the</strong> enemy used two panzer divisions,<br />
three infantry divisions and one parachute division in an infantry-tank<br />
attack on <strong>the</strong> "Ridge Road" just west <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Our River.<br />
In this operation, two enemy divisions assaulted each regiment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 28th. In <strong>the</strong> center and right <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 28th <strong>the</strong> enemy made<br />
advances up to four and a half miles and crossed <strong>the</strong> north-south<br />
highway at several points. In <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> VIII Corps<br />
<strong>the</strong> 9th Armored and <strong>the</strong> 4th Infantry Divisions were also attacked<br />
by <strong>the</strong> enemy. <strong>The</strong>se attacks were diversionary to prevent<br />
our shifting troops to <strong>the</strong> north.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German <strong>of</strong>fensive <strong>the</strong> VIII Corps reserve<br />
consisted <strong>of</strong> an armored combat command and four battalions<br />
<strong>of</strong> combat engineers. <strong>The</strong> engineers were assembled during <strong>the</strong><br />
first morning, and as <strong>the</strong> seriousness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy thrust became<br />
apparent, additional troops were made available. In <strong>the</strong> north<br />
on December 17, Combat Command R <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 9th Armored Division<br />
was released from V Corps and <strong>the</strong> 7th Armored Division<br />
was ordered to close into an assembly area near St. Vith. In <strong>the</strong><br />
south <strong>the</strong> 10th Armored Division was moved toward an assembly<br />
area near <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Luxembourg. Orders were also issued to<br />
move <strong>the</strong> 10Ist and 82d Airborne Divisions to <strong>the</strong> general area<br />
threatened.<br />
From captured documents and from <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> early<br />
thrusts it seemed evident to VIII Corps that <strong>the</strong> objective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
attacks was Liege and possibly Namur. This, however, was a<br />
clear case <strong>of</strong> VIII Corps misunderstanding <strong>the</strong> enemy's intent,<br />
though <strong>the</strong> same misunderstanding prevailed in <strong>the</strong> entire <strong>Army</strong><br />
for months afterward. It was finally found, however, that Hitler