Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...

196 BASTOGNE
was a near crisis when Kokott's rear began to feel pressure .from
the" American thrusts northward to relieve Bastogne. Kokott's
forces first became aware of the pressure when elements of the
5th Parachute Division fell back into their area. There were
five newly arrived Tiger tanks near Kokott's CPo He didn't know
where they had come from and he didn't stop to inquire. He
sent them on down the Clochimont road in an effort to restore
the situation. Soon after the German tanks departed, Kokott
saw the first American troop-carrier planes come over on the Bastogne
re-supply mission. He and his officers saw the parachutes
dropping; they thought that additional paratroops were arriving
to swell the ranks of the defenders. The effect was, as he expressed
it, "to increase the disorder in the ranks of the attackers."
That night, on Corps order, he attacked Marvie, intending to
smash through to Bastogne. The 90lst Regiment was sent against
Marvie, while the 39th Regiment, on its left, moved along the
main road from Assenois. In an extension of this same line, forming
roughly a half circle, the reconnaissance battalion, 26th
Volksgrenadier Division, also moved to the attack and for the
first time was able to close its grip on the Bastogne-Champlon
road. The attack failed, as related earlier in the book. Kokott
received early reports that his forces had "captured" Marvie [an
exaggeration] but he never knew that the Panzer Lehr Division
had broken the line at Hill 500 that night or that some of its
tanks had entered Bastogne. [Kokott's comment on this was:
"They took only the first few houses and then reported to me
that they had captured the village. I acted on the assumption
that they were telling the truth. This is a very common type of
error in our operations."]
On the same night, while the Marvie attack was Bickering,
Kokott was visited at his CP by General Hasso-Eccard Manteuffel,
Commanding General of the Fifth Panzer Army. An
order had come down from XXXXVII Corps that Bastogne would"
be attacked again on Christmas Day and Manteuffel had come
in person to give his instructions. By this time the German high
command was thoroughly alarmed. The continued resistance at
Bastogne and the southern action in support of it were holding