Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...

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APPENDIX
THE ENEMY STORY
ONE RESPECT, the Bastogne story is complete as told in
the preceding chapters. There is the battle as it was seen by
the defending forces from within the Bastogne perimeter and as
it could be clarified for them by all of the normal and accessible
sources of information such as our own official documents, captured
enemy documents, interviews with our key personnel at
all levels, and interrogation of such of the enemy as fell into
our hands in the course of operations. To preserve the integrity
of the narrative from the viewpoint of the defenders, it seemed
essential that the material be presented in that form. Moreover,
since it will be noted in reading this added chapter that the errors
caused by so doing were minor indeed, the Bastogne story becomes
tangible proof of the competence of our own methods of
acquiring intelligence of the enemy and of estimating his capabilities.
There remains, however, the question of exactly what was
occurring among the enemy forces while our own forces were defending
Bastogne so stoutly. What was their design? How did
they view the American action? How did their estimate and
judgment of the tactical events modify their own plan and
movement?
It has been said in high places that the enemy was not really
trying to capture Bastogne. This judgment was taken after a
cursory examination of his plan which fell into our hands in
the course of ' the war. But that is not a final truth and if the full
importance of all that happened in the first days of the Bastogne
defense is to be accurately measured by history, the witnesses
must speak from the opposing camp.
In November and December 1945 there took place a series
of conferences between the three chief actors in the attack on
Bastogne and the author of the Bastogne story. Present were Lieutenant
General Heinrich von Liittwitz, Commanding General
of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Fritz Her-
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