Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
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Y ET<br />
CHAPTER 9<br />
DOUBTS AND DECISIONS<br />
ON THE WHOLE, that first night in <strong>Bastogne</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
situation was good, and it was largely <strong>the</strong> intuition and<br />
hunch and driving energy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leaders that had made it so.<br />
<strong>The</strong> day <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 19th had proved that in <strong>the</strong> few minutes allowed<br />
him <strong>the</strong> night before, General McAuliffe had sized up <strong>the</strong> position<br />
properly.l He had been tossed into a battle in which nearly<br />
all <strong>the</strong> major facts about <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> forces were ei<strong>the</strong>r unknown<br />
or obscure. He had rejected Corps' idea that <strong>the</strong> lOlst Airborne<br />
Division be assembled to <strong>the</strong> southwest <strong>of</strong> <strong>Bastogne</strong>. 2 It was<br />
a point that didn't give particular concern to General Middleton<br />
so long as General McAuliffe got his troops in where <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
best placed to defend <strong>the</strong> town. However, VIII Corps Headquarters'<br />
reasoning was based on <strong>the</strong> long-range thought that after<br />
<strong>the</strong> enemy found he could not get through <strong>Bastogne</strong>, his next<br />
important move would be to <strong>the</strong> southwest. In his hasty reconnaissance<br />
out to <strong>the</strong> westward with Colonel Kinnard, his G-3,<br />
late in <strong>the</strong> day on <strong>the</strong> 18th, General McAuliffe had selected <strong>the</strong><br />
ground for his camp from <strong>the</strong> short-range point <strong>of</strong> view. He<br />
wanted an assembly area which would place him at maximum<br />
advantage with respect to his own immediate deployments and<br />
<strong>the</strong> movements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy in <strong>the</strong> immediate future.s Though<br />
he had no way <strong>of</strong> knowing it at <strong>the</strong> time, his center <strong>of</strong> equilibrium<br />
was on <strong>the</strong> ground far<strong>the</strong>st removed from <strong>the</strong> early dangers<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> encirclement although his two eastward-facing regiments<br />
were pointed directly toward <strong>the</strong> avenues along which <strong>the</strong><br />
Germans would make <strong>the</strong>ir first approaches. <strong>The</strong> first day's results<br />
proved that <strong>the</strong> angels had been with him as he made his<br />
first decisions.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> opening arrangements one decision was taken which<br />
worked out adversely. Lieutenant Colonel David Gold, <strong>the</strong> surgeon<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> WIst Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Carl W.<br />
Kohls, <strong>the</strong> Division supply <strong>of</strong>ficer, had picked out a conveniently<br />
located crossroads to <strong>the</strong> westward <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Division assembly area<br />
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