Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...
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36 BASTOGNE<br />
own fight. He had already tasted <strong>the</strong> shell fire and he didn't want<br />
to tempt it, unnecessarily. Back beyond <strong>the</strong> road's first turning,<br />
about 100 yards from Bottomly's skirmish line, <strong>the</strong>re was a pocket<br />
in <strong>the</strong> hillside to left <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> road where a stone house fitted snugly.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re Colonel Ewell set up his command post. 82<br />
It soon became clear to him! that his 1st Battalion would not<br />
be able to overcome <strong>the</strong> roadblock because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German tanks.<br />
<strong>The</strong> tanks were firing from a defilade close into <strong>the</strong> hillside where<br />
<strong>the</strong> road runs down to Neffe from Bizory. Bottomly couldn't<br />
bring <strong>the</strong> 57mms. to bear because <strong>the</strong> Neffe-<strong>Bastogne</strong> road ran<br />
so straight for <strong>the</strong> last half mile. About 1000, convinced that his<br />
1st Battalion was stopped, Ewell decided to bring <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> his<br />
regiment out <strong>of</strong> <strong>Bastogne</strong>. But this was easier said than done.<br />
<strong>The</strong> VIII Corps was rushing <strong>the</strong> evacuation <strong>of</strong> its last units<br />
and <strong>the</strong>ir troops were streaming through town across <strong>the</strong> line <strong>of</strong><br />
march <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 501st Parachute Infantry would have to<br />
take. <strong>The</strong> 2d Battalion fought its way through this traffic during<br />
<strong>the</strong> next hour and Colonel Ewell ordered <strong>the</strong>m on to an assembly<br />
area on <strong>the</strong> reverse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gently sloping ridge north <strong>of</strong> Major<br />
Bottomly's position. He figured that he would put <strong>the</strong>m out to<br />
<strong>the</strong> left, closed up so that <strong>the</strong>y could be deployed at <strong>the</strong> most advantageous<br />
moment. ss<br />
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 907th<br />
Glider Field Artillery Battalion, and Captain Gerald J. McGlone,<br />
commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> Battery B, 907th, had gone forward to<br />
Colonel Ewell <strong>the</strong> minute <strong>the</strong> radio Hashed word that <strong>the</strong> 1st<br />
Battalion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 501st had met fire at Neffe. McGlone got his<br />
battery into position 500 yards nor<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>of</strong> <strong>Bastogne</strong> on <strong>the</strong> left<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Longvilly road, and opened fire as soon as he was in position,<br />
which was only a few minutes after 1000, December 19.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fog was still thick and <strong>the</strong> battery was working under several<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r handicaps-its radios had never been tested and five <strong>of</strong> its<br />
guns had never been fired. But <strong>the</strong>y spoke now from a distance<br />
<strong>of</strong> only 1,000 yards behind Bottomly's skirmish line. Having<br />
weighed <strong>the</strong> risk that <strong>the</strong> enemy might How on around Ewell's<br />
narrow front-and accepted it-Nelson decided that one battery<br />
was enough in that particular position. He put Battery A, under