Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...

THE ENEMY STORY 177
The onfall of XXXXVII Panzer Corps against the front held
by the American 28th Infantry Division and the general consequences
of that onfall have been brieHly told in Chapter 1 of
this book. Having made its penetration, the further movements
of XXXXVII Corps were intended to be consistent with the overall
policy of the Fifth Panzer Army throughout the German
Ardennes offensive: The mobile divisions would by-pass points
of resistance and remain free to continue the movement; the
clearing out of islands of resistance would be done by the slowermoving
infantry bodies. The policy of the Army was duly transmitted
from Corps down to the divisions. It was believed that
the two armored divisions could quickly overrun Bastogne before
resistance there could solidify. In their sweep directly westward,
the boundary between the 2d Panzer Division on the right
and the Panzer Lehr Division on the left, for the attack on Bastogne,
was an east-west line about halfway between Bastogne and
Noville. The objective of the 2d Panzer Division was the same
crossroads X south of the Bois de Herbaimont which figured so
prominently in the American story. The purpose of the Panzer
Lehr Division was to take Bastogne by attack from the south.
This was the original order as established by the initial plan.
It was not changed before the battle opened although it was in
a degree modified.
On December 12, Liittwitz called his division commanders together,
and addressing his remarks especially to Bayerlein, the
commander of Panzer Lehr, he said to all of them: "Bastogne
must be taken. Otherwise it will remain an abscess on our lines
of communication. We must clear out the whole of Bastogne
and then march on." He added the instruction that if Bastogne
was found to be relatively open, it should be attacked directly
by the most feasible route, but that if it were defended in
strength frontally, the two armored divisions should attempt to
envelop and attack the rear or west. These two expedients failing
and quick capture of the town appearing impossible, the
two armored divisions were to continue their general advance
and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was to undertake the investment
and capture of Bastogne. The effect which this con-