Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days - US Army Center Of ...

60 BASTOGNE
the power of the Gennan attack. That morning he had sent
patrols out to reconnoiter his rear and the patrols had not
returned. BO
Colonel Roberts sparred with the request from Noville. He
still possessed authority to sanction the withdrawal of his own
elements but he reckoned that the situation required steadfastness
for the time being and until the Wist Division was solidly
established in Bastogne. So at first he gave no answer. He left
his own CP and started for General McAuliffe's headquarters to
see what could be done. Before he had gone halfway he ran
into Brigadier General Higgins, assistant division commander of
the WIst. Even as he rapidly sketched the situation to Higgins
(the time was 1050) the 1st Battalion of 506th Parachute Infantry,
under Lieutenant Colonel James L. LaPrade, passed by in
the street. At the head of the regimental column, accompanying
LaPrade, was the 506th's commander, Colonel Robert F. Sink.
Convinced by Roberts' words that the Noville situation was fully
desperate, Higgins on the spot ordered Sink to send a battalion
to Noville and LaPrade automatically drew the assignment.4,
Colonel Sink was further directed that his 2d and 3d Battalions
should be put in Division reserve just north of Bastogne on the
Noville road. 5 At the same time the 1st Battalion, which had
been given the Noville mission, was detached from Regiment
and put under Division control. 6 Colonel Roberts returned to his
CP and called Major Desobry. "You can use your own judgment
about withdrawing," he sajd, "but I'm sending a battalion
of paratroopers to -reinforce you."
Desobry replied, "I'll get ready to counterattack as soon as
possible."
Colonel LaPrade and his staff got up to Major Desobry at 1130
and told him the battalion was on the way.7 It was -not quite
clear to either of the local commanders whether there had been
an attachment of one force to the other but they decided that for
the time being they would keep it a "mutual affair." Colonel La­
Prade and his command had just one I: 100,000 map to serve
them for the forthcoming operation. 9
The commanders agreed that the next order of business was