Mireille Falardeau et Michel Loranger Le choix de stratégies ... - CSSE

BOOK REVIEWS / RECENSIONS 471
individual differences. And he talks wisely about how teacher education might
be improved so that we might approximate to the ideal.
From Barrow’s point of view, his most important critique is of the notion that
mental qualities (like critical thinking, communicative ability, creativity, problemsolving
ability, and imagination) are skills. I am not sure who, exactly, thought
that such qualities were skills. But assuming that Barrow is right, that some
pretty important people thought so and have imposed silly curriculum
requirements on teachers because of it, Barrow argues convincingly that this is
a disastrous mistake. Of course he does not deny that all these things involve the
possession of skill of various kinds and varieties. But not one of them is a skill
or reduces to skill. In arguing this he refers more than once to the earlier work
of Gilbert Ryle, the Oxford philosopher and author of The Concept of Mind.
In this regard, however, Barrow’s account, although on the side of the angels,
is in part on the side of the fallen ones. He tends to use “skill” as a noun and not
an adjective, something Ryle would find misleading systematically. For Ryle
rightly pointed out that some performances are skilled and some are not, and
considered it a general confusion to reify notions like “skill.” Thus one might
paint with skill, or with various degrees of skill, or perhaps totally without
skill — there there are many shades and degrees. But there is no activity to be
called “the skill of painting.” Yet in Barrow we find passages like this:
Now a skill is fairly and unambiguously a particular kind of ability. Not all abilities are
skills. A skill is an ability, usually physical, that is discrete and improved by training and
practice. Thus standing on your head is a paradigm case of a skill. (p. 88)
Of course one can use words as one will. But for avoiding confusion I should
have thought it would have been more in line with Barrow’s overall intentions
to merely say that standing on one’s head is something that one might do
skilfully, or with various degrees of skill, or, perhaps, not at all.
To berate the point, Barrow is so concerned to point out that a variety of
things thought to be skills are not, that he forgets Ryle’s main point, namely, that
many things reified in common speech or in bad philosophy are things best
expressed through adjectives or adverbs and not through nouns. Thus one might
sing, paint, or think about theoretical physics imaginatively, or creatively, or
dully or feebly or badly. One might engage in a discussion thoughtfully,
helpfully, or seriously. One might communicate with vigour or clarity, or
communicate skilfully or clumsily, but not engage in the “skill of communication.”
And so on.
Thus it is not that imagination is not a skill, which is to confuse one apparent
noun with another. Rather it is that both are essentially qualifying notions, that
is, ways in which various activities might be engaged. Then it becomes clear that
imagination cannot be a skill since one may, in general, do X (say, play the
violin) imaginatively but not skilfully or vice versa, or both, or neither.