constituent assembly of india debates (proceedings)- volume vii

This is, in fact, done even now, but there is no statutory obligation to do so.
Subject to these two recommendations, we approve of the provisions in the Draft Constitution.
78. Financial procedure in the Provincial field is governed by sections 78--82 of the Government of
India Act, 1935. The corresponding provisions in the Draft Constitution occur in clauses 149--153. We
recommend--
(1) that in a Province with a bicameral Legislature, if any, the powers of the
Upper House over money bills should be exactly the same as at the federal
level;
(2) that the new provision, in respect of a vote on excess grants,
recommended by us at the federal level should be repeated at the provincial
level also.
79. It is usual in written democratic constitutions to provide that no money can be drawn from the
treasury except on the authority of the Legislature granted by an act of appropriation. In this country,
the practice has been to authorise expenditure by resolutions of Government after the demands have
been voted, and not by law. As the existing practice has been working well in this country, appropriation
by law does not appear to be necessary.
Auditor-General
80. Though the question has not been specifically referred to us, we consider that the status and
powers of the Auditor-General are so closely connected with financial procedure that we have gone into
this matter also. The provisions in respect of the Auditor-General of the Federation are contained in
clauses 106--109 of the Draft Constitution, and those in regard to the Auditor-General of the Provinces,
in clauses 174-175. In substance, all these clauses repeat the existing provisions in the Government of
India Act. We consider the provisions to be adequate for the purpose of securing the independence of the
Auditor-General. We notice that the Auditor-General of India is to perform the functions of the Auditor-
General in respect of the Provincial Governments also for an initial period of three years, and thereafter,
until a particular Provincial Government chooses to appoint its own Auditor-General. We favour the
continuance of a single Auditor-General for the Government of India as well as for the Provincial
Governments, and it is possible that the Provincial Governments will also prefer that course, and will
choose not to use their power of appointing separate Auditor-General for the Government of India as well
as for the Provincial Governments, and it is possible that the Provincial Governments will also prefer that
course, and will choose not to use their power of appointing separate Auditor-General of their own. The
Draft Constitution, however, gives them the option to appoint Auditors-General if they think fit so to do.
We are not sure whether it is possible altogether to do away with this option, much as we should like to
do so; but if the option remains, we recommend that the provisions of sub-clause 3 of clause 174 should
be amended so as to make the Auditor-General of a Province eligible for appointment as Auditor-General
of another Province also.
Borrowing Powers
81. This question is covered by Item I of our Terms of Reference.
The present position is that the Provinces have the freedom to borrow in the open market in India
except when they are indebted to the Centre.