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September 11 Commission Report - Gnostic Liberation Front

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Appendix D: The Federal Reserve and the Three Card Monte<br />

On of the most common scams on the streets of America is a set up of three card Monte.<br />

The intricacies of the scam are legion, but essentially, the dealer’s sleight of hand which<br />

fools the ‘mark’ is covered by a rapid rotation of the three cards. It was the rapid rotation<br />

of the securities settlement fails in the aftermath of <strong>September</strong> <strong>11</strong> th that appears to have<br />

allowed the Bank of New York and the Federal Reserve to engage in a securities<br />

refinancing that scammed the American taxpayer by $240 billion.<br />

A review of the explanations for actions of the Federal Reserve after <strong>September</strong> <strong>11</strong><br />

exposes an amazingly complex web of analysis and speculation. These reports published<br />

by the Federal Reserve argue that the Federal Reserve’s actions increasing the monetary<br />

supply by over $300 billion were justified to overcome operational difficulties in the<br />

financial sector. While impressive as the reports are, what is noted by the casual reader is<br />

that all of the Federal Reserve analysis is speculative and suggestive, using phraseology<br />

such as “may have,” “likely,” “presumably,” or “should have.” There are few - if any -<br />

definitive statements about root cause and the appropriateness of the response.<br />

The general perspective of the industry is captured in such comments as:<br />

“The destructive force of the attacks themselves caused severe disruptions to the U.S. banking system,<br />

particularly in banks’ abilities to send payments. The physical disruptions caused by the attacks<br />

included outages of telephone switching equipment in Lower Manhattan’s financial district, impaired<br />

records processing and communications systems at individual banks, the evacuation of buildings that<br />

were the sites for the payments operations of large banks, and the suspended delivery of checks by air<br />

couriers.” [Liquidity Effects of the Events of <strong>September</strong> <strong>11</strong>, 2001, James J. McAndrews and Simon M.<br />

Potter, FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002, p. 59]<br />

“Following <strong>September</strong> <strong>11</strong>, open market operations were aimed at satisfying the financing needs of the<br />

severely disrupted government securities dealer community, leaving to the discount window the task of<br />

elastically providing balances to satisfy demand at the target rate. The huge additions of funds<br />

following <strong>September</strong> <strong>11</strong> were therefore a by-product of operating procedures designed to target the<br />

overnight funds rate.[3]” [Payment System Disruptions and the Federal Reserve Following <strong>September</strong><br />

<strong>11</strong>, 2001, Jeffrey M. Lacker, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, 23219, USA,<br />

November 17, 2003 printed in Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 51, Issue 5, July 2004, Pages<br />

935-965]<br />

“Fails rose initially because of the destruction of trade records and communication facilities. They<br />

remained high because the method typically used to avert or remedy a fail—borrowing a security<br />

through a special collateral repurchase agreement—proved as costly as failing to deliver<br />

the security.” [When the Back Office Moved to the <strong>Front</strong> Burner: Settlement Fails in the Treasury<br />

Market after 9/<strong>11</strong>, Michael J. Fleming and Kenneth D. Garbade, FRBNY Economic Policy Review /<br />

November 2002, p 35.]<br />

Reading statements like this are suggestive that there were massive, wide spread<br />

disruptions in the system. These were the conditions that “led policymakers to depart so<br />

significantly from previous debt management practices.” [When the Back Office Moved<br />

to the <strong>Front</strong> Burner: Settlement Fails in the Treasury Market after 9/<strong>11</strong>, Michael J.<br />

THE SEPTEMBER <strong>11</strong> COMMISSION REPORT Page 370

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