September 11 Commission Report - Gnostic Liberation Front

Fleming and Kenneth D. Garbade, FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002,
p1.]
While the facts presented by the Federal Reserve analyst’s reports are true, as presented
they tend to distort what really happened in the aftermath of the attack. In truth, while
the analysts reported disruptions at over 800 banks, a deeper look at the reports indicated
that only “a few’ were seriously disrupted. The order of magnitude of disruption at any
bank has never quantified, with the exception of one. Even that statement however,
detracts from the data which suggest that the disruptions were essentially concentrated in
one bank – the Bank of New York. (The same Bank of New York was being
investigated for money laundering charges in relation to the economic pillaging by
Russian by criminal oligarchs who benefited from the illegal securities purportedly being
laundered in the aftermath of September 11 th .) This is because while the Fed was
reporting outstanding account balances over $100 billion per day (while not identifying
the banks involved), the Wall Street Journal reported:
“At one point during the week after September 11, BoNY publicly reported to be overdue on $100
billion in payments. (Beckett, Paul, and Jathon Sapsford, Rebuilding Wall Street: How Wall Street's
Nervous System Caused Pain, Wall Street Journal, September 21,2001)” reported in [Payment System
Disruptions and the Federal Reserve Following September 11, 2001, Jeffrey M. Lacker, Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, 23219, USA, November 17, 2003 p.6.]
The Deutschebank which sat inside the World Trade Center reported no such account
balance increase, and JP Morgan, the other of only two clearing banks which uses the
same traders and communications hub, reported no such increase in its account balance.
Understanding what was happening at the BoNY becomes critical to understanding the
securities settlement issues:
“GSCC and several dealers could not verify what came into and what left their custodial accounts at
BoNY, they could not advise BoNY of securities they expected to receive, and they could not give
BoNY instructions for delivering securities. Additionally, GSCC was unable to verify the movement of
funds into and out of its account at BoNY (GSCC Important Notice GSCC068.01).” [When the Back
Office Moved to the Front Burner: Settlement Fails in the Treasury Market after 9/11, Michael J.
Fleming and Kenneth D. Garbade, FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002, p 46.]
In a world of coincidence The Bank of New York (which had over 8000 employees in its
downtown location), lost three employees that day. One of those three employees was a
man who was in the best position to explain how the attacks would have impacted BoNY.
His name was Michael Diaz-Piedra III, a former West Point graduate and son of a Cuban
exile. Michael was the Vice-President of Disaster Recovery Planning for the Bank of
New York. In the aftermath of September 11, he was reported as being an employee of
Bank of America, or holding another position at the BoNY.
THE SEPTEMBER 11 COMMISSION REPORT Page 371