Ifda dossier 47, May/June 1985

test, it is doubtful if Moscow would have much pleasure from
its allies. This means that Eastern Europe is developing
into an economic, political and security strain on the Krem-
lin. It is possible, therefore, that the Kremlin is now
evaluating other forms of cooperation which will provide the
Soviet Union with more tranquility and stability in its im-
mediate surroundings. If they look around they will see that
the democratic and independent neighbour, Finland, has given
far fewer worries - if in fact any - than the Moscow dom-
inated Eastern European countries. A so-called "Finlandiza-
tion" of Eastern Europe, whilst maintaining the Warsaw pact
may be a development in the Soviet's interest. This would
then open new perspectives for European cooperation across
East-West borders. Part of Western Europe strategy must be
that we do not follow policies which counteract such a de-
velopment in Europe.
If we accept that the conflict between the USA and USSR is
not an ideological conflict between communism and capital-
ism, but a conflict of interest between two super powers, we
have a reasonably sober basis for the policies we should be
looking for. The economic problems are not reserved solely
for the West. The economy haunts also the Soviet Union and
the other Eastern European countries.
This, combined with the increased strength of the popula-
tion's demands and opinions results in a number of Eastern
bloc countries dramatically altering the economic course.
In the long term this should provide possibilities of a more
balanced economic cooperation between Eastern and Western
Europe.
All post-war experience from divided Europe indicates that
detente and cooperation have not only served the cause of
peace, but have also aided in the development of human
rights and possibilities in Eastern Europe.
It is more or less readily apparent that the open demo-
cracies in the West have no reason to fear a cooperation, as
open as possible, with Eastern Europe. Therefore it is con-
trary to what we stand for when we go in for a policy aimed
at closing and isolating authoritarian states in the East.
This does not mean that there will not be situations where
our emotional reactions are so strong that we, for a shorter
or longer period, indicate this by means of sanctions, even
though these may not be rational with regard to our politi-
cal goals. Examples such as Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968 show this. But our main line of
policy must be to promote open cooperation between Eastern
and Western Europe. There appears to be, for the most part,
agreement on this in Western Europe.