MGNREGA_SAMEEKSHA
MGNREGA_SAMEEKSHA
MGNREGA_SAMEEKSHA
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82 Bibliography<br />
different regions, and proposes the types for water management works under NREGS for each typology, which has the potential<br />
to generate labour demand, while producing welfare effects.<br />
Basu, A. K., ‘Impact of Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes on Seasonal Labor Markets: Optimum Compensation and<br />
Workers Welfare’, Journal of Economic Inequality, US: Springer, May 2011.<br />
Abstract: The recent enactment of the NREG Act in India has been widely hailed as a policy that provides a safety net for<br />
the rural poor with the potential to boost rural income, stabilise agricultural production and reduce rural-urban migration.<br />
This study models the impact of such employment guarantee schemes in the context of an agrarian economy characterised by<br />
lean season involuntary unemployment as a consequence of tied labour contracts. Specifically, it examines labour and output<br />
market responses to a productive rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) and determines the optimal compensation to<br />
public work employees consistent with the objectives of (i) productive efficiency in agriculture and (ii) welfare maximisation<br />
of the labourers. The author’s framework provides a theoretical one for the evaluation of a number of (sometimes) conflicting<br />
observations and empirical results on the impact of an EGS on agricultural wages, employment and output, and underscores the<br />
importance of the relative productivity of workers in the EGS programme vis-à-vis their counterparts engaged in agricultural<br />
production in determining the success of these programmes.<br />
Bedi, Arjun S., and Subhasish Dey, ‘The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in Birbhum’, Economic and Political<br />
Weekly, vol. 65, no. 41, 9 October 2010.<br />
Abstract: This study of the functioning of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme between February 2006 and July<br />
2009 in Birbhum district, West Bengal, reveals that in order to serve as an effective ‘employer of last resort’, the programme<br />
should provide proportionately more job-days during the agricultural lean season and wages should be paid in a timely<br />
manner.<br />
Berg, E., S. Bhattacharyya, R. Durg, and M. Ramachandra, ‘Can Rural Public Works Affect Agriculture Wages: Evidence<br />
from India’, WPS/2012–5, Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Papers, 2012.<br />
Abstract: It has long been hypothesised that public works programmes, in addition to the welfare effect on those directly<br />
employed, can influence equilibrium wage rates. In this study, the authors test the impact of the Indian government’s major<br />
public works programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG), on agricultural wages. The rollout of NREG<br />
in three phases is used to identify difference-in-difference estimates of the programme effect. Using monthly wage data from<br />
the period 2000–11 for a panel of 249 districts across 19 Indian states, we find that, on average, NREG boosts the real daily<br />
agricultural wage rates by 5.3 per cent. It takes six to 11 months for an NREG intensity shock to feed into higher wages. The<br />
wage effect appears to be gender neutral and biased towards unskilled labour. It is positive across different implementation<br />
stages and months. It remains significant even after controlling for rainfall, district and time fixed effects, and phase-wise<br />
linear, quadratic, and cubic time trends. The validity of the authors identification strategy is confirmed by placebo tests. They<br />
have argued that since most of the world’s poor live in rural areas, and the poorest of the poor are agricultural wage labourers,<br />
rural public works constitute a potentially important anti-poverty policy tool.<br />
Bhalla, S. S., ‘No Proof Required: Corruption by any Other Name’, The Indian Express, 4 February 2012.<br />
Abstract: This is a secondary analysis based on both official <strong>MGNREGA</strong> and NSS data. The author has developed a corruption<br />
index for <strong>MGNREGA</strong> based on difference in participation of the poor and non-poor and the expenditure on the poor and<br />
non-poor under the programme.<br />
Bhatia, K., and A. Adhikari, ‘NREGA Wage Payments: Can We Bank on the Banks’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 65,<br />
no. 1, 2 January 2010.<br />
Abstract: The study discusses the hardships NREGA workers face when they do not have banks or post offices near their homes.<br />
Their difficulties are further exacerbated if the transaction is processed through the post offices because of poor record-keeping<br />
and the inability to cope with mass payments of NREGA wages.<br />
Bhattacharyya, Sambit, Raghav Gaiha, and Raghabendra Jha, ‘Social Safety Nets and Nutrient Deprivation: An Analysis of<br />
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme and the Public Distribution System in India’, ASARC Working<br />
Paper 2010–4, Canberra: Australian South Asian Research Centre (ASARC), 2010.