Making Targeted Sanctions Effective - Small Arms Survey

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This pre-assessment of targeted sanctions should also try to anticipate
potential country-specific legal issues that Member States may
encounter in implementing sanctions and clarify to the greatest
extent possible the specific measures that Member States are obliged
to take in order to implement UN sanctions and to fully comply
with the resolution.
Distinct and Accurate Definitions
Unclear demands make it difficult for Member States and relevant
non-state actors to comply, create confusion for Member States regarding
the purpose of the sanctions, and can lead to different positions
by Members as to when sanctions are to be ended. “Constructive
ambiguity” can result in difficulties with implementation. Evaluations
of specific sanctions regimes often follow only after a period
of time. Recently, the Security Council has taken a more proactive
approach by appointing Expert Panels and Monitoring Mechanisms.
This is important in strengthening the sanctions regimes. In
Part II, Section 4, proposals are suggested in this regard. Here the
following can be added:
— GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Maximize clarity with respect to the demands made of the targeted
actors as to the objectives of the sanctions, the behavior that must
change, and (when relevant) deadlines of compliance. This will
make it more difficult for the targeted actor to distort the meaning
of the sanctions.
Include definitions of targeted sanctions from the Interlaken and
Bonn-Berlin Reports and related publications that have credible
and unambiguous definitions for the types of sanctions under consideration.
In cases where the Security Council does not include definitions in
the text of the resolution, Sanctions Committees should be encouraged
to direct Member States that raise questions about definitions
to widely agreed sources for clarification, such as those contained in
the manuals on sanctions produced by the previous processes.