Making Targeted Sanctions Effective - Small Arms Survey

THE STOCKHOLM PROCESS | 52
small, dedicated Expert Panel support facility within the UN Secretariat.
2. Second, whatever form it may take, the envisioned support facility
should have built-in safeguards to assure that its functions do not
compromise the independence of the ad hoc Expert Panels and Monitoring
Mechanisms.
3. Third, to meet immediate needs, the development of the recently
established standing Roster of Experts, as well as the elaboration of
transparent methods for their selection, and steps to centralize and
store accumulated documents and information of past and current
Expert Panels and Monitoring Mechanisms should proceed in the
interim. These capacities can be built into the Sanctions Branch as
currently structured and need not await a decision by the Security
Council of the final form of the proposed support facility.
Budgetary Resources
§ 116 That adequate budgetary support is critical to the effective implementation,
monitoring and enforcement of targeted sanctions is
self-evident. Thus far, however, the Sanctions Branch and Sanctions
Committees have had to scramble to secure financing of the Expert
Panels and Monitoring Mechanisms. Ideally, this financial support
should be anticipated, budgeted, and supplied from the outset of
the creation of an Expert Panel or Monitoring Mechanism, as failure
to do so can lead to unnecessary and costly delays in their field
investigations, incomplete investigations, and the late remuneration
of experts.
§ 117
To date, however, it has proven difficult to ascertain the realistic
budgetary needs of the Expert Panels or of UN sanctions implementation
more broadly. In particular, there has been no systematic
assessment of the budgetary requirements of the Expert Panels and
Monitoring Mechanisms, a problem exacerbated by frequent recourse
to Trust Funds. It was also noted that those Sanctions Committees
chaired by representatives of well-endowed states have had
additional, extra-budgetary resources to draw upon. While this has
improved the monitoring capacity of select sanctions regimes, it has
also created a discrepancy in capacity and performance among sanctions
regimes.