Making Targeted Sanctions Effective - Small Arms Survey
Making Targeted Sanctions Effective - Small Arms Survey
Making Targeted Sanctions Effective - Small Arms Survey
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§ 85<br />
§ 86<br />
§ 87<br />
§ 88<br />
Ensure Solid Evidentiary Reporting Standards<br />
THE STOCKHOLM PROCESS | 42<br />
While the reports of the Expert Panels and Monitoring Mechanisms<br />
are available for public consumption, their primary purpose is to<br />
provide sanctions-related information to the <strong>Sanctions</strong> Committees<br />
and the Security Council, and should be written with this purpose<br />
in mind.<br />
As the credibility of the process depends upon the veracity of investigative<br />
findings, reports should be drafted according to the highest<br />
possible evidentiary standards. At a minimum, particular findings<br />
should be corroborated by two independent, verifiable sources. Investigators<br />
should endeavor to ensure that every assertion is corroborated<br />
by solid evidence.<br />
In the absence of subpoena powers, experts will rely on two sorts<br />
of information: confidential information supplied by cooperating<br />
states and/or international officials, journalists, and private individuals;<br />
and information in the public domain. Investigators should<br />
take particular care in weighing the reliability of confidential information,<br />
keeping in mind the identity and role of the source supplying<br />
it.<br />
When the reliability cannot be fully established, experts should<br />
evaluate the degree of reliability according to standard criteria (see<br />
Table 1). While a decision to report on allegations lacking full, transparent<br />
validation is at the discretion of the panel or monitoring<br />
team, such allegations should normally be avoided.