Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska

Due Process
Conn v. Conn, 13 Neb. App. 472, 695 N.W.2d 674 (2005)
A prisoner has no absolute constitutional right to be released from prison so that
the prisoner can be present at a hearing in a civil action.
The U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV;
Neb. Const. art. I, § 3. “When a person has a right to be heard, procedural due
process includes . . . a reasonable opportunity to refute or defend against a charge
or accusation [and] a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses and present evidence on the charge or accusation . . . .”
Although due process.does not require the appointment of.counsel to represent a
prisoner in. a private civil matter, due process.does require that the prisoner.
receive.meaningful access to.the courts to.defend against suits.brought against him
or her.
Where due process so requires, we do not read §42-356 to prohibit a trial court from
allowing one of the parties to appear by telephone during a final hearing held in
open court upon the oral testimony of witnesses.
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. ____ (June 2011) (See also page 32 of this outline)
Issues Presented: (1) whether the Supreme Court of South Carolina erred in holding – in
conflict with twenty-two federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort – that an
indigent defendant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt
proceeding that results in his incarceration, and (2) does the Court have jurisdiction to review
the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court?
Held: We …hold that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of
counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support
order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year). In particular, that Clause does
not require the provision of counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to whom
support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative
procedural safeguards equivalent to those we have mentioned (adequate notice of the importance
of ability to pay, fair opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and court
findings).
Since the NCP did not have clear notice that ability to pay would be the critical question in
this proceeding, nor was he provided with information that would have allowed the NCP to
disclose such information, the South Carolina courts erred in finding him able to pay and thus in
civil contempt.
‣ We must decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires
the State to provide counsel (at a civil contempt hearing) to an indigent person
potentially faced with such incarceration.
‣ We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support)
is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial
parent (required to provide the support). But we attach an important caveat, namely,
that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a
fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question,
whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order.
‣ The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, while it does not require a state to
provide counsel at civil contempt proceedings to indigent individuals, even if
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