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DARPA ULTRALOG Final Report - Industrial and Manufacturing ...

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R<strong>and</strong>om<br />

Small-world<br />

Scale-free<br />

with distinct properties found in nature. A<br />

network’s evolutionary mechanism is designed<br />

such that the network’s inherent properties<br />

emerge owing to the mechanism. For<br />

example, small-world networks were designed<br />

to explain the high clustering coefficient<br />

found in many real-world networks,<br />

while the “rich get richer” phenomenon used<br />

in the Barabási-Albert model explains the<br />

scale-free distribution. 2<br />

Similarly, we seek to design supply networks<br />

with inherent survivability components<br />

(see Figure 3), obtaining these components by<br />

coining appropriate growth mechanisms. Of<br />

course, having all the aforementioned properties<br />

in a network might not be practically feasible—we’d<br />

likely have to negotiate trade-offs<br />

depending on the domain. Also, domain specificities<br />

might make it inefficient to incorporate<br />

all properties. For instance, in a supply<br />

network, we might not be able to rewire the<br />

edges as easily as we can in an information<br />

network, so we would concentrate more on<br />

obtaining other properties such as low characteristic<br />

path length, robustness to failures<br />

<strong>and</strong> attacks, <strong>and</strong> high clustering coefficients.<br />

So, the construction of these networks is<br />

domain specific.<br />

Establishing edges between network nodes<br />

is also domain specific. For instance, in a supply<br />

network, a retailer would likely prefer to<br />

have contact with other geographically convenient<br />

nodes (distributors, warehouses, <strong>and</strong><br />

other retailers). At the same time, nodes in a<br />

file-sharing network would prefer to attach to<br />

other nodes known to locate or hold many<br />

shared files (that is, nodes of high degree).<br />

Obtaining the survivability<br />

components<br />

While evolving the network on the basis<br />

of domain constraints, we need to incorporate<br />

four traits into the growth model for<br />

obtaining good survivability components.<br />

The first is low characteristic path length.<br />

During network construction, establish a few<br />

long-range connections between nodes that<br />

require many steps to reach one from<br />

another.<br />

The second is good clustering. When two<br />

nodes A <strong>and</strong> B are connected, new edges<br />

from A should prefer to attach to neighbors<br />

of B, <strong>and</strong> vice versa.<br />

The third is robustness to r<strong>and</strong>om <strong>and</strong> targeted<br />

failure. Preferential attachment—where<br />

new nodes entering the network don’t connect<br />

uniformly to existing nodes but attach preferentially<br />

to higher-degree nodes (see the side-<br />

Degree<br />

distribution<br />

Characteristic<br />

path length<br />

Clustering<br />

coefficient<br />

Robustness<br />

to failures<br />

P(k)<br />

Poisson<br />

<br />

k<br />

Scales as<br />

log(N)<br />

p (the connection<br />

probability)<br />

Similar responses<br />

to both r<strong>and</strong>om<br />

<strong>and</strong> targeted<br />

attacks<br />

Peaked<br />

1.0<br />

0.8<br />

0.6<br />

0.4<br />

0.2<br />

0.0<br />

2 4 6 8 10 12<br />

k<br />

Scales linearly with N<br />

for small p. And for higher<br />

p scales as log(N)<br />

High, but as p → 1<br />

behaves like<br />

a r<strong>and</strong>om graph<br />

Similar response as<br />

r<strong>and</strong>om networks.<br />

This is because it has<br />

a degree distribution<br />

similar to r<strong>and</strong>om<br />

networks.<br />

P(k)<br />

1<br />

0.1<br />

0.01<br />

0.001<br />

0.0001<br />

Power law<br />

1 10 100 1,000<br />

k<br />

Scales as<br />

log(N)/log(logN))<br />

((m–1)/2)*(log(N)/N)<br />

where m is the number of<br />

edges with which a<br />

node enters<br />

Highly resilient to r<strong>and</strong>om<br />

failures while being very<br />

sensitive to targeted<br />

attacks<br />

Figure 2. Comparing the survivability components of r<strong>and</strong>om, small-world, <strong>and</strong><br />

scale-free networks.<br />

Manufacturer<br />

Warehouse<br />

Warehouse<br />

Warehouse<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Manufacturer<br />

Manufacturer<br />

Warehouse<br />

Warehouse<br />

Warehouse<br />

Figure 3. The transition from supply chain to a survivable supply network.<br />

Failed node<br />

Failed edge<br />

Alternate path<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

Retailer<br />

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2004 www.computer.org/intelligent 27

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