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DARPA ULTRALOG Final Report - Industrial and Manufacturing ...

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Manuscript for IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 17<br />

decentralization will give a byproduct, information security. As we discussed earlier our effort is<br />

to support survivability. If information is revealed to others directly information security will be<br />

in question. In this section we decentralize the programming model through an auction market.<br />

7.1 Two-tier auction market<br />

There are two popular methods of decentralizing structured programming models:<br />

decomposition methods <strong>and</strong> auction/bidding algorithms. Considering the compatible structure of<br />

the programming model, we decentralize it through a non-iterative auction mechanism, so called<br />

multiple-unit auction with variable supply [27]. In this auction a seller may be able <strong>and</strong> willing<br />

to adjust the supply as a function of bidding. In the programming model we have built, all<br />

components are coupled with each other. However, the objective function <strong>and</strong> constraints are<br />

separable if one variable T is fixed. This characteristic makes it possible to solve the model<br />

through an auctioning process for T. The completion time T is an unbounded resource <strong>and</strong> the<br />

supply can be adjusted as a function of bidding. To design the auction market we define a seller<br />

which determines T * based on the bids from the components. We call this auction market as<br />

Two-tier Auctioning Model.<br />

We define T i as available resource of component i which is required minimally to the amount<br />

of T i(min) as in (12) <strong>and</strong> maximally T i(max) as in (13).<br />

T<br />

T<br />

= [ R ( t ) L ( t ) f ( v )] / MRA ( t )<br />

(12)<br />

i (min) i +<br />

i<br />

i<br />

i(min)<br />

= [ R ( t ) L ( t ) f ( v )] / MRA ( t )<br />

(13)<br />

i (max) i +<br />

i<br />

Each component bids to the seller with maximal value as a function of T as in (14). The seller<br />

decides T * based on the bids by considering CCT(T) as in (15). After the seller broadcasts T * ,<br />

each component selects its optimal value mode in the limits T * as in (16). Though this auctioning<br />

i<br />

i(max)<br />

i<br />

i

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