Wireless Network Design: Optimization Models and Solution ...

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7 Spectrum Auctions 175 21. Dunford, M., Hoffman, K., Menon, D., Sultana, R., Wilson, T.: Ascending combinatorial auctions. Tech. rep., Systems Engineering and Operations Research Department, George Mason University (2008) 22. Elmaghraby, W., Keskinocak, P.: Combinatorial auctions in procurement. In: T.P. Harrison, H.L. Lee, J.J. Neale (eds.) The Practice of Supply Chain Management: Where Theory and Application Converge, International Series In Operations Research and Management, vol. 62, pp. 245–258. Springer US, New York (2004) 23. Epstein, R., Henriquez, L., Catalan, J., Weintraub, G.Y., Martinez, C.: A combinatorial auction improves meals in chile. Interfaces 32, 1–14 (2002) 24. Erdel, A., Klemperer, P.: A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions. Journal of the European Economic Association (2009) 25. Fujishima, Y., Leyton-Brown, K., Shoham, Y.: Taming the complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. Proceedings of IJCAI, pp. 548–553 (1999) 26. Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A., Ledyard, J.O.: An experimental comparison of the FCC’s combinatorial and non-combinatorial simultaneous multiple round auctions. Tech. rep., Economics Department, The University of Virginia (2006). Prepared for the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau of the FCC 27. Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica 61, 617–631 (1973) 28. Hoffman, K., Menon, D., van den Heever, S.A.: A package bidding tool for the FCC’s spectrum auctions, and its effect on auction outcomes. Telecommunications Modeling, Policy, and Technology 44, 153–189 (2008) 29. Hoffman, K., Menon, D., van den Heever, S.A., Wilson, T.: Observations and near-direct implementations of the ascending proxy auction. In: P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg (eds.) Combinatorial Auctions, pp. 415–450. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2005) 30. Hohner, G., Rich, J., Ng, E., Reed, G., Davenport, A., Kolagnanam, J., Lee, H.S., An, C.: Combinatorial and quantity discount auctions with mutual benefits at mars, incorporated. Interfaces 31, 23–35 (2002) 31. Kaglannas, A., Askounis, D., Psarras, J.: Power generation planning: A survey from monopoly to competition. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems 26, 413–421 (2004) 32. Klemperer, P.: What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economics Perspectives 16, 169–189 (2002) 33. Klemperer, P.: Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey (2004) 34. Klemperer, P.D.: Auctions with almost common values. European Economic Review 42, 757– 69 (1998) 35. Krishna, V.J.: Auction Theory. Academic Press, London (2002) 36. Kwasnica, A.M., Ledyard, J.O., Porter, D., DeMartini, C.: A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions. Management Science 51, 419–434 (2005) 37. Ledyard John, O., Olson, M., Porter, D., Swanson, J.A., Torma, D.P.: The first use of a combined-value auction for transportation services. Interfaces 32, 4–12 (2002) 38. McMillan, J.: Selling auction rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 145–182 (1994) 39. McMillan, J.: Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets. W.W. Norton and Company, New York (2002) 40. Metty, T., Harlan, R., Samelson, Q., Moore, T., Morris, T., Sorensen, R., Schneur, A., Raskina, O., Schneur, R., Kanner, J., Potts, K., Robbins, J.: Reinventing the supplier negotiation process at motorola. Interfaces 35, 7–23 (2005) 41. Milgrom, P.: Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2004) 42. Nisan, N.: Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In: EC ’00: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pp. 1–12. ACM, New York, NY, USA (2000). DOI http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/352871.352872 43. Parkes, D.C.: iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 148–157 (1999)
176 Karla Hoffman 44. Parkes, D.C.: Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI 44, 269–302 (2005) 45. Porter, D., Rassenti, S., Roopnarine, A., Smith, V.: Combinatorial auction design. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 100, pp. 11,153–11,157 (2003) 46. Porter, D., Smith, V.: FCC auction design: A 12-year experiment. Journal of Law, Economics and Policy 3, 63–80 (2007) 47. Rothkopf, M.: Thirteen reasons why the vickrey-clarke-groves process in not practical. Operations Research 55, 191–197 (2007) 48. Steiglitz, K.: Snipers, Shills and Sharks: eBay and Human Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey (2007). Page 298. 49. Vickrey, W.: Counter-speculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance XVI, 8–37 (1961) 50. Wilkie, S.: Spectrum auctions are not a panacea: Theory and evidence of anti-competitive and rent-seeking behavior in FCC rulemakings and auction design (2007). Working Paper
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International Series in Operations
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Editors Jeff Kennington Eli Olinick
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vi Preface assistance. The work of
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viii Contents 3.4.1 Experiments to
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x Contents 8.3.2 The Solution Proce
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xii Contents References . . . . . .
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List of Contributors Khaldoun Al Ag
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List of Contributors xvii Nitin Sal
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Chapter 1 Introduction to Optimizat
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1 Introduction to Optimization in W
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1 Introduction to Optimization in W
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Part I Background
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10 Dinesh Rajan The goal of this ch
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12 Dinesh Rajan The source encoder
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14 Dinesh Rajan ping (FH) CDMA, and
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16 Dinesh Rajan of SNR is given in
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18 Dinesh Rajan 2.3 Information The
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20 Dinesh Rajan Perror ≤ e −nE
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22 Dinesh Rajan For instance, for t
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24 Dinesh Rajan 2.4.1 Block Codes I
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26 Dinesh Rajan B(z) = 1 � (1 + z
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28 Dinesh Rajan layers. Two of the
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30 Dinesh Rajan nel can support a p
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32 Dinesh Rajan 2.5.2 Physical laye
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34 Dinesh Rajan matched filter for
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36 Dinesh Rajan codes) leads to bet
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38 Dinesh Rajan a length N Inverse
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40 Dinesh Rajan the transmission of
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42 Dinesh Rajan setting, a node may
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44 Dinesh Rajan weighting of the si
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46 Dinesh Rajan 29. Oestges, C., Cl
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48 K. V. S. Hari terrain of operati
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50 K. V. S. Hari fading is calculat
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52 K. V. S. Hari terms have been pr
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54 K. V. S. Hari Fig. 3.1 Normalize
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56 K. V. S. Hari Table 3.3 Impulse
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58 K. V. S. Hari where m antennas a
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60 K. V. S. Hari 3.5.2.4 Dominant R
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62 K. V. S. Hari March, 1984-13 Sep
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64 K. V. S. Hari 47. Van Rees, J.:
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66 J. Cole Smith and Sibel B. Sonuc
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Part II Optimization Problems for N
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102 Eli Olinick carrying capacity.
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104 Eli Olinick 93 85 160 16 38 21
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106 Eli Olinick Amaldi et al. [7] p
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108 Eli Olinick levels (possibly le
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110 Eli Olinick gmℓ ∑ ∑ m∈M
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112 Eli Olinick Using bk to denote
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114 Eli Olinick 5.3.5 Additional De
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116 Eli Olinick capacity, provide n
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118 Eli Olinick ficult optimization
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120 Eli Olinick and-bound so that t
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122 Eli Olinick solution times. Cai
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10 Integer Programming Models for P
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Chapter 11 Improving Network Connec
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11 Improving Network Connectivity i
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Chapter 12 Simulation-Based Methods
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12 Simulation-Based Methods for Net
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296 Hang Jin and Li Guo formance in
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298 Hang Jin and Li Guo (ISI) as lo
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300 Hang Jin and Li Guo ARQ (HARQ)
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302 Hang Jin and Li Guo 13.3 Radio
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304 Hang Jin and Li Guo Table 13.2
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306 Hang Jin and Li Guo is transmit
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308 Hang Jin and Li Guo uplink powe
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310 Hang Jin and Li Guo The link ad
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312 Hang Jin and Li Guo where ρ mi
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314 Hang Jin and Li Guo 13.4.4.3 Ex
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316 Hang Jin and Li Guo Fig. 13.9 P
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318 Hang Jin and Li Guo 1. Guarante
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Chapter 14 Cross Layer Scheduling i
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14 Cross Layer Scheduling in Wirele
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Chapter 15 Major Trends in Cellular
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15 Major Trends in Cellular Network
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