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05 Issue # 11/11 : PublIc Issues
political levels – municipal, cantonal, national – usually
happens four times a year. Referendums are either mandatory
elements of the decision-making process or they can
be demanded by a specific number of voters. In the case
of Zurich's main station there were two votes, in 1985 6 and
in 1988 respectively. 7 Even though both referendums were
decided in favour of the project, they delayed the develop-
ment process, and were thus responsible for the loss of
momentum at crucial moments.
It must be underlined that the sheer holding of a re-
ferendum prompts intense public debate, where issues are
illuminated from all angles. Referendums play a decisive
role in raising public awareness of issues of great public
importance. Therefore, and while not clearly and easily
understandable, even if these referendums are lost, they
can contribute to a shift in general public opinion. The
second referendum clearly showed this. It was won by the
promoters, but only by 50.7%. This chance result was not
enough to legitimize the promoters to continue at will.
This result implied the mandate to seriously reconsider
the opponents' arguments and, furthermore, to review the
project.
Three legal instruments played crucial roles in the plan-
ning process. First, the old station building was listed
in 1972 under the Monument Protection Act (Denkmalschutz),
thus stopping the first planning attempt. Second, the
federal Clean Air Act (Eidgenössische Luftreinhalteverordnung
LRV) of 1985 made it possible to file a suit against
polluters. Third, since 1966, national NGOs have the
right to appeal against large building projects, thus en-
abling VCS (Switzerland ecological transport association)
to challenge the number of projected parking lots, which –
as it turned out – became the decisive issue in the almost
endless legal fight (Wolff 2004).
Market forces
When everything else seemed to have fallen into place and
construction was ready to begin, the economic situation
shattered the plans. Every time there was a chance to pro-
ceed, in 1973, in 1992, and in 2001, the business environment
was fragile, the global economic situation was
uncertain, or the banks as main investors were in trouble.
In 1973, it was the oil shock and the global economic
recession that dealt the final blow to HB Südwest. In 1991,
the collapse of the real estate market in the wake of
another economic recession; and in 2001, after another real
estate crisis, such mega-developments had definitely run
out of time. Eurogate had become a dinosaur in a world
that had changed.
In the meantime, industrial decline had opened up new
development opportunities in Zurich. Huge brownfield sites
had become available on the fringes of the inner city,
where it was easier and cheaper to build than on top of a
busy main station. Areas like Zurich West or Zurich North
drew attention and lured investments away from the inner
city. It is also in these areas that a new and more flex-
ible cooperative planning paradigm was successfully
developed (Hofer 2004).
Technical obstacles and the end
In the end, technical obstacles came on top of everything
else. By 2001, when it was decided to construct a second
SBB underground terminal (Tiefbahnhof Löwenstrasse). As
part of this major project, SBB had to realign the tracks
in the station area, thus making it impossible to build
above the railway lands for the next ten years.
HB Südwest / Eurogate was
too big, too expensive, too
difficult, and last but not
least too unconvincing. Over
30 years of planning ended
in shambles, with a total
loss of 80 million Swiss
francs, the folding of two
consortia, and the near bank-
ruptcy of architect Baenzi-
ger's office. In the meantime,
it had become clear
that the project was hampered
by one significant fauIt:
its size and the required in-
vestments were too large
and they could not be phased.
Decking the tracks could
only be done in one go. As
one of the most experienced
real estate developers put
it: "HB Südwest is too large
for a city like Zurich.
The market can't take it"
(Stuart Lipton, 1998). 8
Stadtraum HB / Europaallee
The only value that remained
unaffected by the multiple
failures of HB Südwest / Euro-
gate was the physical attrac-
tion of the site. Zurich's
boom as a global city con-
tinued unbroken. The demand
for inner city office space
remained high despite new
developments at the edges
of the inner city in Zurich
West, Neu-Oerlikon, and in
the Glattal. The decision to
build the second underground
station (Löwenstrasse)
further boosted the centrality
of Zurich's main
station.
Thus, only two years after
the final collapse of
Eurogate, a total restart
was announced. In 2003, the
City of Zurich, SBB, and
the Federal Post Office (the
latter two were now semiprivatized),
joined forces
to start from scratch. Right
from the beginning, they
made it clear that they had
learned their lessons and
that nothing should remind
anyone of HB Südwest / Euro-
gate: there would be no
decking of the tracks and
there would be a new planner /
architect. To underline the
fact that the new project
would restart with a clean
slate, the project was re-
branded Stadtraum HB
(literally 'City Space Main
Station').
6
In September 1985,
the popular ini-
tiative 'HB Süd-
west – So Nicht!'
("Main Station
Southwest – Not
like this!") put
forward by a citi-
zens association
was clearly
rejected by 70%
of voters.
7
In September 1988,
the battle over
the 'real estate
development of the
century' and the
fight against the
'folly above the
rails' ('Das Un-
ding über den
Geleisen', Snozzi
1987), was decided
by a 50.7% vote in
favour of the pro-
moters' area
development plan.
8
Stuart Lipton of
Rosehaugh &
Stanhope, one of
London's major
developers
(responsible for
projects like
Broadgate/ Liver-
pool Street
Station), in a
personal communi-
cation with the
author.