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09 Issue # 11/11 : PublIc Issues
Who won, who lost?
Comparing the old plans and the current product
So what has been gained compared to the old HB Südwest /
Eurogate plans? Is this project better or worse than
the original one? What was improved, who won, who lost?
How have the extended planning process and prolonged
resistance affected the project?
The central aim of extending Zurich's limited central
business district into the station area and of better
using the railway lands has definitely been achieved,
albeit with a different approach. As a consequence of the
decision to build the new underground terminal and the
Post Office's decision to give up its distribution centre,
large parts of the trackfield became available for a
development without expensive decking structures. In ad-
dition, extra railway plots were added in the northwestern
part of the plot to further enlarge the project area.
By leaving the area over the main tracks untouched, much
resistance and many problems were side-tracked. Still,
the amount of total floor space and the mix of uses have
remained within the same range. Of course, the land which
would have been won by the decking is now not available.
However, it must be repeated, it would have been expensive
to create that land; the fact that its development could
not be phased was one of the main economic reasons to stop
the project.
The significant difference from an urban design perspective
comes with abandoning the decking of the tracks.
As a major gain, railway access to Zurich and the station
platforms enjoy daylight exposure. The physical appearance
and the perception of the station – including the trackfield
– in the city have as such been preserved. What has
been lost is the broad deck connection across the tracks
between the two neighourhoods, districts 4 and 5, a fea-
ture many would have welcomed.
Whereas the physical project has changed and its substance
has been adapted, the effects have by and large remained
the same. Still, looking at the final outcome of the mixed
use development under construction some of the results
can be seen as a compromise after struggle lasting fifty
years. More public space and semi-public ground floor uses,
perhaps even the teacher training college in this location,
can be listed on the positive side of the balance sheet.
Some expensive apartments, senior citizen accommodation, a
hotel, and much office space in a central location can be
seen as positive or negative, depending on the standpoint.
From the opponents' point of view, the struggle for a more
modest, eco-friendly, neighbourhood-protecting development
has largely been lost. Europaallee does not have much to
offer to the existing social environment. Its enrichening
contribution will be marginal, limited to some new shops,
slightly more public space, but all not corresponding much
with the needs and desires of the area's current inhabitants.
Europaallee is a stepping stone for the further
expansion of the central business district into traditional
working class areas. Whether and how much the adjacent
neighbourhood will be gentrified and to what extent this
is an effect of Europaallee will probably remain disputed.
Where does this development take Zurich as a whole?
The history of HB Südwest and its result as Stadtraum HB
have taught the City of Zurich, its planners, politicians,
developers, and corporate elite a number of important
lessons. First, Stadtraum HB has proven that it is still
possible to realize large scale projects in Zurich. After
a number of failed or still contested projects (Zurich's
Convention Centre, Kleeblatt
highrise apartments, Hardturm
football stadium), this
is politically important.
With Stadtraum HB Zurich has
also created a new gateway
for those entering the city
by rail. Looking from the
opposite direction, the tra-
ditional central business
district of Bahnhofstrasse
has been extended and
strengtened.
Second, Stadtraum HB / Europa-
allee has also shown that an
appropriate planning process
is crucial for this type
of (mega-)project. In stark
contrast to its predecessors
depending on a costly deck
across the tracks as a lump
pre-investment, Europaallee
has allowed for a piecemeal
approach in pace with eco-
nomic up- and downturns.
Giving up the decking and
realigning the project's
parameters was also instrumental
in breaching the
oppositional lines.
Thirdly, Europaallee and its
pre-history have clearly
shown the limits of private
public partnerships, which
in the Zurich case are label-
led as a 'cooperative plan-
ning process'. Politically,
the attempts to sideline
democracy with the muchlauded
but undemocratic co-
operative planning process
have failed. From a planning
perspective, the limits to
outline development plans
have become obvious. Public
participation remains the
key factor to successful
planning. The political and
legal struggles have made it
clear that without a very
broad consensus, projects of
this size and scope cannot
be realized within a useful
time frame. Planning expe-
rience from brownfield deve-
lopments in Zürich Nord and
Zürich West, gathered while
HB Südwest tumbled from one
crisis into the next, helped
develop more intelligent co-
operation processes. Europa-
allee is thus also a new
approach to urban development.
The specific style of
planning and development
represents a more sensitive
and inclusionary approach
to urban development. Taking
into consideration many