Methodological Individualism

100 Austrian methodological individualismexception, the action of the participating individuals. This is not necessarilytrue for other disciplines.(Weber [1913] 1981: 158)Weber mentions jurisprudence, which is justified in treating some collectivesas wholes, without bothering much about the component individuals. Thus, forthe purposes of legal science, the state might be treated as a ‘legal person’, but‘[f]or sociological analysis, the word “state” – if it is used at all – signifies only acourse of human action of a particular kind’ (Weber [1913] 1981: 159).In his essay on ‘The Meaning of “Ethical Neutrality” in Sociology andEconomics’ (1917), Weber writes about the ‘individualistic orientation’ ofeconomic theory and maintains that this individualistic orientation is ‘apolitical’and for ‘analytical purposes only’ (Weber, 1949: 44)The term ‘individualistic method’ does not appear in Weber’s writings untilthe posthumous publication of Economy and Society (1922). This work also containsWeber’s most mature and most extensive treatment of methodological individualismand is, therefore, the main source for an understanding of his ideas on thissubject. What he has explicitly to say about methodological individualismappears in the negative form of contrasts and oppositions to other doctrines,from which a positive statement has to be extracted. But one thing emergesclearly: Weber’s ‘individualistic method’ is inseparable from his definition ofsociology as concerned only with subjectively meaningful behaviour, that is,action.Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) isa science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of socialaction and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.We shall speak of ‘action’ insofar as the acting individual attaches asubjective meaning to his behavior – be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence.Action is ‘social’ insofar as its subjective meaning takes account ofthe behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.(Weber [1922] 1978: 4)It is to be observed that interpretive understanding is not an end in itself, buta means for arriving at a causal explanation of action. To this effect, Webermakes the distinction between ‘direct observational understanding’ and ‘explanatoryunderstanding’, which was part and parcel of the hermeneutic traditionbefore Weber. Direct observational understanding is achieved when an action isidentified as being of a certain type, explanatory understanding when the motiveof the action is known. ‘A correct causal interpretation of a concrete course ofaction is arrived at when the overt action and the motives have both beencorrectly apprehended and at the same time their relation has become meaningfullycomprehensible’ ([1922] 1978: 12).It may also be pointed out that Weber’s social action makes sociologydifferent from economics, which starts with the isolated individual and sees the