Methodological Individualism

Popperian methodological individualism 221‘And so the edge of his psychologism is gone; indeed if we follow Popper we haveto admit that the edge of all reductionism is gone’ (p. 292).In a recent article, written in celebration of Popper’s Open Society, Agassi hasapparently grown weary of the attention paid to the lack of clarity about institutionsin Popper’s methodology, ‘let us not spend time on efforts to clarify a textbeyond a reasonable limit. Investments in clarification of texts can prove themnot acceptably clear; efforts to clarify them should yield some return’ (Agassi,1997: 510). Since it is my aim, in this book to clarify the meaning of ‘methodologicalindividualism’, I hope that I am excused, if I have tried to reach someclarity about Popper’s institutionalism, but I agree with Agassi, that it is reallynot possible: ‘Popper’s theory of the autonomy of sociology renders institutionsreal in some sense. He was unclear about this. So it is better left alone. We havethus reached a limit on reading Popper on individualism in all respects saveresponsibility’ (Agassi, 1997: 510).Agassi (1977: 298, note 62) refers to Ian C. Jarvie’s Concepts and Society (1972)as the clearest statement of the diverse contemporary views regarding individualism.This may be, but, in my opinion, Jarvie does not succeed in his attempt toreconcile Popper’s methodological individualism with his institutionalism and histheory of world 3, without removing the inconsistencies.Ian C. JarvieIan Charles Jarvie entered the intellectual scene as an astute defender ofPopper’s methodological individualism, guaranteeing that all statements aboutsocial classes could be ‘reduced to individualist terms’. This guarantee is basedupon a firm belief in nominalism and, therefore, valid for all social wholes orcollectives. To the question: ‘Why is the soldier more ontologically “real” thanthe Army?’, Jarvie replies: ‘Simply because “Army” is merely a plural of soldierand all statements about the Army can be reduced to statements about theparticular soldiers comprising the Army. The Army has, then, no “being”, thereis no “Ghost in the machine”’ ( Jarvie, 1959: 57). 9 Jarvie’s first explicit statementof methodological individualism is a restatement of Watkins’s final version. Itcomprises ‘the metaphysical theory … that human individuals are the onlycausal factors in society’, and the consequent ‘axiomatic methodologicalprescription: “Explain all social events in terms of human factors”’ ( Jarvie, 1961:12).In his first book, The Revolution in Anthropology (1964b), Jarvie changes sidesfrom Watkins to Agassi. He now argues that institutions must be reckonedamong the determinants of human behaviour and, therefore, enter explanationsof social action.Popper’s great discovery is that aims and ideal types are not enough toexplain action; circumstances, material and institutional, are required in theexplicans. Institutions are, so to speak, a third force in the society and their