Methodological Individualism

Notes 38517 See, e.g. Brodbeck (1954: 148ff; [1958] 1968: 301f), Mandelbaum (1955: 305ff; 1957:222f; 1977: 235ff), Gellner (1956: 174f; 1960: 514–16), Danto (1965a: 269ff), Putnam(1973–4: 135), Addis (1975: 42f), Vanberg (1975: 4), Mellor (1982: 51) and Pettit([1993] 1996: 117ff).18 Weber’s method of verstehen is deemed psychologistic by Runciman (1972: 74f),Outhwaite (1975: 46, 104) and Elster (2000: 26). According to Torrance (1974: 148)Weber was ‘pushed in a psychologist direction by [his] methodological individualism’.Weber’s relation to psychology and his rejection of psychologism, is a recurrent themein Huff (1984).19 See, especially, Weber ([1903–6] 1975: 101–20, 129–52, 172ff; 1908a; 1908b:119–24; [1922] 1978: 7, 13, 19).20 See Weber ([1903–6] 1975: 189f; 1908a: 29f, 32f; [1913] 1981: 154ff; [1922] 1978:19; 1949: 74f, 88f).21 In Weber (1949: 90), it is suggested that the ideal type is a heuristic device, but not ahypothesis, although it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. In Weber([1903–6] 1975: 189f) and ([1913] 1981: 157), however, the ideal type has the statusof a hypothesis. In Weber ([1922] 1978: 9–11, 18f), finally, the ideal type is both aheuristic device and a hypothesis.22 See Hempel (1965: 166) and Vanberg (1975: 107f, 121).23 See Popper ([1945] 1966: vol. 2, 97; 1957: 140–3; [1962] 1976: 102f).24 See Popper ([1945] 1966: vol. 2, 90, 97; 1957: 153f; [1962] 1976: 101).25 On this point, see, especially Lichtheim (1965). See also Lessnoff (1974: 106–8) andVanberg (1975: 109ff).26 See, e.g. Little (1991: 195–99; 1998: 10–13; 203) and Kinkaid (1997: 46–8). Cf. alsoSatz and Ferejohn (1994: 85).27 On the connection between methodological and normative individualism, seeBrodbeck (1954: 142), Burman (1979: 357), Blaug (1980: 49f), Heine (1983), Hodgson(1988: 70–2), Madison (1990: 47), Shand (1990: 2, 31f), Kingdom, (1992), Vanberg(1994: 1) and Kinkaid (1997: 2).28 This does not prevent Elster from making the following statement: ‘From Stalin to theRed Guards this outlook [a speculative philosophy of history] has led to a disregardfor individuals that goes far beyond the denial of methodological individualism’ (Elster,1985: 117).29 A good example of this affinity, is the constitutional economics of James Buchanan.This theory is based on the idea of unanimous consent, which is the political counterpartof economic exchange. According to James Buchanan, it is also based onmethodological individualism. But, when used in the context of politics, methodologicalindividualism transforms into political individualism, which, in its turn, is basedon ethical individualism (see Udehn, 1996: 174ff).30 This argument was advanced by Hayek in a number of articles in the 1930s (see,especially, ‘Socialist Calculation’, I–III, ‘Economics and Knowledge’ and ‘The Use ofKnowledge in Society’, all in Hayek, 1948). A similar argument has been used byPopper (1957: 79f).31 There is another kind of humanism, which sees the dignity of human beings in theirachievements rather than in their freedom. Among these achievements are scienceand literature, works of art and social institutions. The latter kind of humanism tendsto be holistic.32 See also Strawson ([1962] 1968: 58–96) and James (1984: 70–5).33 ‘The truth contained in environmentalism is the cognition that every individual live ata definite epoch in a definite geographical space and act under the conditions determinedby his environment. The environment determines the situation but not theresponse. To the same situation different modes of reaction are thinkable and feasible.Which one the actors choose depends upon their individuality’ (Mises, 1957: 326).