Methodological Individualism

7 Popperian methodological individualismNotes 3751 This procedure may be seen as part of the early Popper’s strategy of replacing metaphysicalissues with their methodological counterparts. In The Logic of ScientificDiscovery (1934), Popper said that ‘not a few doctrines which are metaphysical, andthus certainly philosophical, could be interpreted as hypostatizations of methodologicalrules’ ([1934] 1972: 55). The ‘principle of causality’, for instance, was excluded‘as “metaphysical” from the sphere of science’ and replaced by the correspondingmethodological rule (p. 61).2 See Popper ([1945] 1966: vol 1: 31–4, vol 2: 9–21; 1957: 26–34; 1962: 103–7).3 See Popper ([1962] 1968: 18–21; 1972: 194–7; 1974a: 12–23; 1976: 17–31). There aretimes, however, when words do matter, even to Popper. Such is the case, for instance,when some members of the Frankfurt School call him a ‘positivist’. ‘A last word on theterm “positivism”. Words do not matter, and I do not really mind if even a thoroughlymisleading and mistaken label is applied to me. But the fact is that throughout my life Ihave combated the positivist epistemology, under the name of “positivism”. I do notdeny, of course, the possibility of stretching the term “positivism” until it can beapplied even to an opponent of positivism such as myself. I only contend that sucha procedure is neither honest nor apt to clarify matters’ (Popper, 1970: 261).4 The separation of persons (or individuals) is not accidental. In his contribution toRoads to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich von Hayek, Popper says (1969: 199) aboutsituational logic, that ‘[i]t makes room for giving full weight … not only to individualsbut also to institutions’ [my italics].5 Cf. also Popper ([1962] 1968: 350): ‘Democracy as such cannot confer any benefitsupon the citizen and it should not be expected to do so. In fact democracy can donothing – only the citizens of the democracy can act (including, of course, those citizenswho comprise the government)’.6 The incompatibility of Popper’s theory of objective knowledge with methodologicalindividualism, as usually conceived, has been pointed out by several commentators.See, e.g. Ackerman (1976: 166–72), Ingram (1976: 134f), O’Hear (1980: 197ff),Chalmers (1985), Udehn (1987: 204–7) and Stokes (1997: 63).7 On the theory of emergent evolution as a form of holism, see, e.g., Nagel (1961:366ff), Phillips (1976: 32f;), Udehn (1987: 85ff) and Bunge (1996a: 258ff).8 The earlier methodological individualists were in no doubt that individualism andinstitutionalism are opposite methodologies. This opposition was part of the Battle ofMethods and it is confirmed by all Austrians, who lump together the GermanHistorical School, American institutionalism and mainstream sociology, asapproaches committed to a ‘realistic’, empirical investigation of social institutions asopposed to the individualism of theoretical economics. See, e.g., Schumpeter ([1914]1954: ch. 4; 1954: 20f, 26f, 983–95, 864–77) and Mises ([1933] 1976: 4–12; [1949]1966: 4; 1990: 210). The opposition between individualism and institutionalism isalso obvious to the founder of the Chicago School of Economics, Frank H. Knight,who contrasts ‘the “institutional” view of economic activities’ with ‘the individualisticor contractual aspect’ (Knight, 1956: 18; see also 1935/6: 330).9 The expression ‘Ghost in the machine’ is, of course, a reference to Gilbert Ryle’s TheConcept of Mind (1949), where it is argued that the mind, or soul, is a ghost in themachine of the body, that is non-existent.10 In a recent article on Popper’s situational logic, Jarvie (1998) defends Popper’s ‘institutionaland situational individualism’ (p. 374) against the more radical individualismthat he finds in contemporary rational choice. He refers to Jon Elster as one of hisexamples, and this is justified, since Elster is a reductive individualist (see pp. 310–16),but it is not justified as a criticism of contemporary rational choice as a whole. To avery large extent recent rational choice is ‘institutionalistic’, in the sense of Popper,and in some cases even ‘structuralistic’ (see chs 9–10).