Methodological Individualism

Notes 36913 Manfred F. Kuhn, the leader of the Iowa School of Symbolic Interactionism, criticisedMead and Cooley for excessive subjectivism, and for failing in their relationbetween self and other (Kuhn, 1967: 171–84).14 In ‘Parsons as a Symbolic Interactionist: A Comparison of Action and InteractionTheory’ (1974), J.H. Turner attempted a synthesis of symbolic interactionism andfunctionalism. In his ‘Comments on Turner’, Blumer declared that he sees ‘the jointact as primarily an “organization” of action’ (p. 59). The methodological implicationis that ‘whereas symbolic interactionists would study the process of symbolic interaction,Parsons would study the products of this interaction’ (p. 61). In his reply toBlumer, Turner (1975) complained that symbolic interactionism has ‘few conceptsand propositions to explain the operation of social processes at other than a microlevel of interpersonal interaction’ (p. 65). Also, ‘it is not clear that interactionism hasany concepts to describe emergent social structures’ (p. 66). Turner is, of course,perfectly correct in these judgements, but it is not necessarily a defect of a socialpsychological theory to lack such concepts, even if Mead thought so, and Turnerthinks so, unless the adherents of such a theory claims that it is a comprehensivetheory of society. Concerning Blumer, himself, it may be pointed out that he seems tohave grown more individualistic over the years. In his early article on ‘SocialDisorganization and Individual Disorganization’, a more holistic language is found.He writes, for instance, about people occupying different social positions.15 On society as a negotiated order, see A.L. Strauss, et al. (1963: 147–69; 1964: 15f,146–58, 293–315, 373–77).16 The dramaturgical approach is used in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959)and in Frame Analysis (1974: ch. 5). The model of the game is used in the essay ‘Fun inGames’, in Encounters (1961: 17–81) and in Strategic Interaction (1970).17 The statement that the individual may be influenced by social processes, does notalter this conclusion, since social processes have their basis in a plurality of individuals.18 For an introduction to phenomenological social science, in general, and phenomenologicalsociology, in particular, see Natanson (1973) and Wolff (1979). For a morecomprehensive treatment of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology, seeRogers (1983).19 On the problematic relation between Schutz and Husserl, see Natanson (1968: 235ff;1973: 23), Tiryakian (1965: 30).20 See, especially, A. Gurwitch (1962: 71f), who argues that there is a close affinitybetween Dilthey’s descriptive psychology and the thought of the later Husserl, andsince Schutz’s ideas are a continuation of those of the later Husserl, Schutz’sphenomenology can be seen as a fulfilment of Dilthey’s project of a descriptivepsychology. See also M. Natanson, who writes (1968: 241): ‘To be sure, it is perfectlyreasonable to take the book [Schutz’s The Phenomenology of the Social World] as a sympatheticcorrective for certain philosophical inadequacies in Weber’s sociology; it isequally permissible to classify the work as an application of Husserl’s ideas to the fieldof the social sciences’.21 It may be added that Husserl read Schutz’s Phenomenology of the Social World in the yearof its appearance (1932) and called Schutz a ‘serious and thorough phenomenologist’and ‘one of the very few persons who managed to penetrate to the deepest meaningof my life work, which, unfortunately, is accessible only under heavy difficulties’(quoted in Wagner, 1983: 46). Husserl also asked Schutz to become his assistant.These facts make it highly unlikely that Schutz was guilty of serious misunderstandingof Husserl’s phenomenology.22 In his later writings, Schutz takes his point of departure in Husserl’s idea of a lifeworld(see, e.g., Schutz, 1940: 178–86; 1945b: 82–5, 92–5; 1959: 93, 95).