Methodological Individualism

386 Notes34 For a critique of sociology of knowledge, from an individualist point of view, Mises(1933: 186–94; [1949] 1966: 4–7, 72–91; [1957] 1985: 122ff), Hayek ([1952] 1963:192f; 1955: 76, 89, 180) and Popper ([1945] 1966, vol. 2: ch. 23).35 According to Watkins (1970: 176f), behaviourism is not only inadequate when appliedto human beings, but ‘unfair to rats’. Agassi (1977: 166) maintains that ‘vulgarbehaviourism, like vulgar Marxism, is but an object of inquiry, not a target for anyserious criticism’.36 See especially Popper, who is the most energetic defender of mind–body dualism, orinteractionism. His most elaborated argument can be found in Popper (1977).37 See Boudon (1981: ch. 8; 1982: chs 1 and 7) and Elster (1978: 160; 1979a: 66–8;1986a: 22f). On the normative element in Elster’s methodological individualism, seeWarren (1988). Also Philip Pettit’s ([1993] 1996) individualism may be interpreted asa defence of human freedom, or autonomy.12 Methodological individualism restated1 It is very common, in the literature on methodological individuals, to make thedistinction between methodological and ontological individualism. At least onecommentator (Scott, 1960) has also made a distinction between methodological andepistemological individualism. Rajeev Bhargava (1992: ch. 1) distinguishes betweenontological, explanatory and semantic individualism, and a variety of different formsof explanatory individualism. What Bhargava calls ‘semantic individualism’ has beendiscussed by Pettit (in Macdonald and Pettit, 1981: ch. 3) as a matter of the ‘expressiveautonomy’ of institutions (see also Tiles, 1984 and Pettit, 1984). I conceive ofsemantic, or expressive individualism as a version of epistemological individualism.Since scientific theories have a linguistic form, I believe that semantics is part of epistemology.2 According to Weber’s well-known definition, ‘[a]ction is “social” insofar as its subjectivemeaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in itscourse’ (Weber [1922] 1978: 4). According to Winch’s also well-known alternative,social action is rule-governed action, presupposing a social setting. (Winch, 1958:116–20).3 This interpretation of methodological individualism – as a principle of explanation –is favoured also by Philip Pettit in Macdonald and Pettit (1981: ch. 3) and by virtuallyall who interpret methodological individualism as a quest for microfoundations, especiallythose who identify microfoundations with rational choice.4 The first to point out that methodological individualism is often stated as an ontologicalthesis was probably Goldstein (1958: 1ff; 1959: 240–1). On the distinctionbetween methodological and ontological individualism, see also Koertge (1974: 198f);Ruben (1982: 1; 1985: 1ff) and Kinkaid (1996: 187–90; 1997: 13f). According to M.Bunge (1979: 15), ‘every theoretical view of society and, for that matter, of anyconcrete object, has two components: an ontological and a methodological. Theformer concerns the nature of society, the latter the way to study it’.5 Empiricists, when faced with metaphysical, or ontological problems have typicallyturned them into epistemological, logical, or methodological questions. This is theonly way to deal with them, when metaphysics is forbidden. The strategy of Popper isto transform ontological (and epistemological) problems to methodological ones.According to Popper ([1934] 1972: 55), ‘not a few doctrines which are metaphysical… could be interpreted as typical hypostatizations of methodological rules’.6 See, e.g., Mises ([1949] 1966: 42ff), Hummell (1973: 138f), Homans (1980: 19) andSztompka (1979: 299).7 See Ryle (1949) for a classic analysis of dispositions. On intentions, see Anscombe(1968: 144–52) and MacIntyre (1972: 48–70).